Key participants of the game:

  • state X, the initiator of the “hybrid” aggression (NATO non-member state, nuclear potential exists)
  • state Z, the victim of the aggression (NATO member state, Baltic region)
  • NATO, as an organization of collective security (at the level of North Atlantic Council)
  • OSCE representation


Background for Simulation Game.

Five years ago the leadership of the country X, actively using security services, began to form ideological, political and military background of the forthcoming aggression against the state Z. It was used the infiltration of a number of loyal persons into the state/governmental agencies of Z; bribing of influential government officials, political leaders and leadership of power structures; promoting of agents of influence to positions in the state government; fomenting confrontation between different political forces and establishment of control over them (primarily among ideologically close and corrupted parties and movements in order to gain useful information and undermine the state institutions from inside). Further the X established in Z a number of NGOs, using quite big national minority of the aggressor country along with the tough history of the mutual relations, as the basis for their activities, aimed on destabilization of the country. These NGOs extended and coordinated their activities on the Internet-platform under the auspice of the so-called “People’s Republic of Z (PRZ)”.

Throughout the five last years they successively expanded their activities, conducting peaceful (demonstrations) and violent protest actions in order to spread separatist moods within the country. Simultaneously country X has launched ideological brainwash of its own population in order to unite it around the ideas of nationalism and great-power chauvinism, defending of so-called “national values and interests abroad” struggle against the “foreign enemy” describing X as the “besieged fortress”. This approach is followed by comprehensive weakening of the country-target of aggression, undermining public confidence in the government as well as spreading of protest and separatist sentiments provoked by socio-economic and other problems (including through the use of elements of economic, trade and energy “wars”); discrediting of foreign and domestic policies of the enemy country, imposing on its leadership and population of certain ideas and civilizational values through active information campaign using special methods of information, psychological, propaganda operations with extensive involvement of both governmental and non-governmental organizations.

Lately the most active NGO, driven by the ethnic minority with its charismatic leader and local celebrity Mr. Y was transformed into a national political party. Lately Mr. Y was criticizing the national authority and was walking around in public with so called George’s Ribbon. His cooperation with the best-selling X’s magazines and newspapers, First National Channel provided him a huge media attendance.

Two years ago the aggressor country X created in the country-target illegal armed groups from among the representatives of local anti-government forces, with involvement of security officers, criminals, mercenaries and militias, provoking an internal conflict in the country on political, social, economic, religious or ethnic grounds, as well as stimulation of processes helping its development into mass protests of the population, actions of public unrest, riots and demonstrators’ clashes with police. These actions were followed by creation of the alternative “PRZ authorities”. Three weeks ago the government building and important objects of transport and industrial infrastructure were captured by protesters (including members of illegal armed groups and security services of the aggressor), as well as using civilians as “human shields”, accompanied by conducting large-scale information campaigns in support of anti-government forces in Z, and discrediting of its leadership’s actions to ensure the constitutional order in the country.

Ongoing protests, initiated and provoked by the meanwhile strong anti-governmental movement caused a deep internal political crisis, dividing the country’s population into the two antagonistic camps. The weakened government of Z is permanently losing its control over the state affairs and institutions in the regions on the border with X. Meanwhile the X is consolidating their so-called “self-defense units” from the local community and the citizens of X, including officers of special services, military special forces, Cossack and other paramilitary forces. It follows by creation of groups of troops destined for the invasion and demonstration of force near the borders of Z under the guise of trainings and ensuring the safety of the football world cup in Z in two months.

At this, situation in Z becomes the most suitable moment for active X’s involvement. It is characterized by the weakness of the national government because of the internal political crisis and temporary absence of the heads of state, as well as demoralization of the personnel of national law enforcement agencies in the crisis situation in the country.

On these days we observe the seizure of governmental buildings in the most crisis-affected parts of country by the special services of X under the guise of “unknown persons”, accompanied by deployment of so-called “self-defense groups” (“little green men”), who took control of the local authority structures and key infrastructure facilities, having blocked the units of security agencies of Z in the region.



Hybrid war – does it even exist?[1]

The recent Russian intervention in Ukraine has generated much debate about the use and effectiveness of hybrid warfare, a type of warfare widely understood to blend conventional/unconventional, regular/irregular, and information and cyber warfare.

An analyst looks at code in the malware lab of a cyber security defense lab. © REUTERS

In the last decade, some of the most important military forces and coalitions in the world, including the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), have attempted to address and counter so-called hybrid threats. Rather than develop strategies based on ‘hybrid’ challenges (an elusive and catch-all term), I believe decision-makers should stay away from it and consider warfare for what it has always been: a complex set of interconnected threats and forceful means waged to further political motives.

The term ‘hybrid warfare’ appeared at least as early as 2005 and was subsequently used to describe the strategy used by the Hezbollah in the 2006 Lebanon War. Since then, the term “hybrid” has dominated much of the discussion about modern and future warfare, to the point where it has been adopted by senior military leaders and promoted as a basis for modern military strategies.

The gist of the debate is that modern adversaries make use of conventional/unconventional, regular/irregular, overt/covert means, and exploit all the dimensions of war to combat the Western superiority in conventional warfare. Hybrid threats exploit the “full-spectrum” of modern warfare; they are not restricted to conventional means.

In practice, any threat can be hybrid as long as it is not limited to a single form and dimension of warfare. When any threat or use of force is defined as hybrid, the term loses its value and causes confusion instead of clarifying the “reality” of modern warfare.

There is no discussion that adversaries, past and present, have developed creative uses of the “full-spectrum” of warfare, including the use of regular and irregular tactics across all dimensions of war. Altogether this may well form a hybrid set of threats and strategy, but it is not clear why the term “hybrid” should be used, beside its mere descriptive value.

In practice, any threat can be hybrid as long as it is not limited to a single form and dimension of warfare. When any threat or use of force is defined as hybrid, the term loses its value and causes confusion instead of clarifying the “reality” of modern warfare.

Another issue with everything “hybrid” is that the use of a new term suggests there is something new about modern warfare – while this may not be the case. In his seminal book on Future Warfare, renowned military strategist Colin Gray convincingly argues that future, and by extension modern, warfare is essentially more of the same.

Most, if not all, conflicts in the history of mankind have been defined by the use of asymmetries that exploit an opponent’s weaknesses, thus leading to complex situations involving regular/irregular and conventional/unconventional tactics. Similarly, the rise of cyber warfare has not fundamentally changed the nature of warfare, but expanded its use in a new dimension.


At a recent event sponsored by NATO and organized by the Atlantic Council, attendees were told that “there is no agreed definition of terms related to hybrid warfare.” In other words, the 28 members of the North Atlantic Alliance cannot agree on a clear definition of what they are facing. How can NATO leaders expect to develop an effective military strategy if they cannot define what they believe is the threat of the day?

So my recommendation is that NATO, and other Western decision-makers, should forget about everything “hybrid” and focus on the specificity and the interconnectedness of the threats they face. Warfare, whether it be ancient or modern, hybrid or not, is always complex and can hardly be subsumed into a single adjective. Any effective strategy should take this complex environment into account and find ways to navigate it without oversimplifying.


Deterring hybrid warfare: a chance for NATO and the EU to work together?[2]

In response to the conflict in Ukraine, NATO has decided to take on an ambitious task: developing a set of tools to deter and defend against adversaries waging hybrid warfare.

As the conflict in Ukraine illustrates, hybrid conflicts involve multilayered efforts designed to destabilise a functioning state and polarize its society. Unlike conventional warfare, the “centre of gravity” in hybrid warfare is a target population. The adversary tries to influence influential policy-makers and key decision makers by combining kinetic operations with subversive efforts. The aggressor often resorts to clandestine actions, to avoid attribution or retribution. Without a credible smoking gun, NATO will find it difficult to agree on an intervention.

Undoubtedly, prevailing in hybrid warfare presents NATO with an institutional challenge. To effectively counter irregular threats, the Alliance will need to strengthen cooperation with international organisations, particularly with the EU.

NATO has a wide range of instruments at its disposal. The Alliance has expended a great deal of effort in recent years to stay abreast of new threats, especially in cyberspace. Nevertheless, NATO, as a military alliance, will never embrace the full spectrum of challenges embodied in hybrid warfare.

The current NATO deterrence policy for hybrid warfare is based on a rapid military response. This policy has three potential weaknesses. First, member states may find it difficult to agree on the source of a conflict, creating a significant barrier to prompt collective action. Second, to counter irregular threats, hard power alone is insufficient. Regardless of how rapid a response may be, deploying military force to an area swept by hybrid warfare will turn out as “too little too late”. Too often, the conflict evolves under the radar. Finally, a deterrent built upon military force alone will not be credible. To deal with irregular threats, NATO cannot simply revive the strategy of massive retaliation, or rely exclusively on one course of action.

NATO should consider a more flexible policy and strive to deter prospective adversaries with a wide range of instruments. By partnering with the EU and expanding its set of instruments, the Alliance will be able to tackle the threat from multiple angles. What is more, it may be even able to prevent it.

The EU seems the organisation best suited to complement NATO’s crisis management efforts, as it offers a diversity of instruments that can be employed in hybrid warfare. NATO and the EU could create an effective institutional tandem that has a wide range of both political and military instruments at its disposal. The NATO Summit in Wales acknowledged the EU as a strategic partner of the Alliance. And the common threat of hybrid warfare within the Euro-Atlantic area presents a solid opportunity to develop this partnership even further.

NATO and the EU should intensify consultations and engage in joint planning, especially in implementing the EU Council decisions on security in December 2013. The inter-institutional cooperation should become more systematic and pragmatic.

Events in Ukraine have changed the threat perception in Europe. Recent pledges to reverse declining defence budgets confirm this. NATO and the EU should take advantage of this momentum. Through close coordination in defence planning, both organisations can avoid duplication and achieve greater convergence. The European Council meeting in June 2015 will offer a good opportunity to review and possibly adjust the future course of cooperation. NATO’s Secretary General should not miss the opportunities this meeting will bring.

Prevention represents the best possible means of countering hybrid warfare. Irregular threats are far more difficult to manage once they become an overt attempt at destabilisation. Rolling armour columns and exchanges of open fire, as witnessed in Ukraine, signify that a hybrid conflict had entered its later stages. Skirmishes such as these may easily evolve into an insurgency with no foreseeable political or military solution. As appears likely in Ukraine, the result may be a “frozen conflict.”


States that appear vulnerable to destabilisation can adopt measures to increase the resilience of their security sectors in advance. The concept of Security Sector Reform (SSR), embedded in UNSC (United Nations Security Council) Resolution 2151 offers an indispensable tool to tackle the challenges of hybrid warfare. SSR aims to strengthen a state’s ability to provide public safety and secure the rule of law, while embracing transparency and accountability. The transatlantic community should call upon the countries prone to destabilisation to take on the SSR initiative. These measures will not only better prepare the country to counter external threats, but will also help pave its way to sustainable development and prosperity.

The EU has incorporated SSR into its Common Security and Defence Policy operations. It’s now concluding its first successful mission of this kind in the Democratic Republic of Congo and has recently launched an SSR mission in Ukraine. A strong security sector and well-developed soft power serves as the best measure to secure peace and stability in European neighborhood, particularly against the subversive threats witnessed in Ukraine.

To effectively defend against hybrid warfare, I believe the Alliance will need to expand its capabilities and strengthen its cooperation with the EU. Through a comprehensive approach, NATO and the EU will be able to employ an entire palette of instruments to an emerging conflict. By embracing the concept of SSR, NATO and the EU can focus their efforts on the most vulnerable states and help them to become more resilient against destabilising threats. The two organisations should not miss out on this chance to advance their partnership to a new level. By more closely coordinating their efforts, NATO and the EU could not only avert irregular threats, but could help secure peace and stability in the Euro-Atlantic area for the foreseeable future.

Hybrid war – hybrid response?[3]

At one point during the Ukrainian crisis, Russia had 40,000 troops

lined up on the Ukrainian border, but when it came to sowing instability in Ukraine, it was not conventional forces who were used, but rather unorthodox

and varied techniques, which have been dubbed hybrid warfare.

Russia is using it to try to play for unilateral, national advantage, taking territory, imposing its will, invading countries, annexing territory…

Stuff you can’t make up.

I think the Russians have been very smart. Frankly, I think they have outsmarted us. They use commandoes and they pretend they are not Russian.

In terms of information warfare, they have been extremely good. You know, we have here a debate in the West: Provocative, not provocative, presence here, presence there.

The Russians have Russia Today, which responds to Putin’s orders, having one message, and it reverberates. It’s using Western technologies. Whereas the message itself is very, you know, kind of communist style, one would say.

This crisis goes well beyond the borders of Ukraine.

What effectively Putin has now said, is that the defence of ethnic Russians does not lie in the countries in which they reside or with their laws, government or constitution, but with Russia.

This blows a hole in everything we understood about international law. But despite these techniques often being referred to as a new approach, there is evidence to indicate that it’s not new for Russia.

Go back to Estonia in 2007, go back to Georgia in 2008. I think the concept of using kind of a slow effort, a slow encroachment, has been  part of the strategic landscape, certainly for Russia, for quite some time. Sometimes it involves more overt and obvious moves, sometimes it’s more subtle moves, economic warfare, sometimes it may be cyber attacks, conducted under the cover of being activists at work.

And it can be a combination of them and I think this has been a set of tactics that has been deployed to one degree or another, for the last five or six years.

As a student of Russian history and particularly Russian military history, the use of such agents provocateurs through mainly military intelligence organs, special forces, goes way back.

Destabilising, decapitating administrations, creating the space for influence, let’s call it that, that’s nothing new. So, we’ve just got to have the political courage to call it for what it is.

There is still a split in Europe between those willing to say… confirm what it is they’re seeing and those who’d rather it all went away and will find almost any excuse for what Russia is doing.

So the question now is: how does NATO respond to the use of these techniques and is it the most appropriate organisation to do so?

Russia is going to use special operations and intelligence forces, economic pressure, energy pressure, cyber attacks and potential conventional force directly to achieve imperial goals. And is NATO willing to use any of those tools to prevent that or not?

That’s what we need to see.

I don’t think NATO has the tools for that. The European Union might have the tools, but if the European Union, the Commission particularly, does have them, I haven’t seen them being employed.

We should be flexible enough to take all these new threats, like energy, like cyber, like media, like these strange green human beings… You know.

And we should do that on time, not after something happens. Some recommend that the best way to counter this is to invite a stronger, not weaker response. What creates de-escalation is a strong response that causes Russia to think twice about going any further, stabilises a tense situation and then allows it to de-escalate.

This has all been still been very reactive, very slow…

Many of the statements we’ve heard from NATO leaders, have been: if Russia goes further, we will take additional steps. It ought to be the other way around. These techniques also pose the problem that without clear command and control of certain forces, it can be difficult for all sides to know how events will unfold.

The problem is that starting a crisis is easy, but ending it is extremely difficult.

You know what you do when you start creating unrest at the Crimea and maybe at the eastern part of Ukraine. But then it gets a dynamic of its own and that is highly dangerous. And I’m fully confident that Putin simply doesn’t know the next steps as well.

Statement by the NATO Defence Ministers on the Readiness Action Plan[4]

  1. We, the Allied Defence Ministers, met today to review progressand direct further work on the implementation of the NATO Readiness Action Plan. At the summit in Wales, our leaders set out the response of the Alliance to the substantial changes in the security environment on NATO’s borders and beyond. As we progress towards the Warsaw Summit in 2016, our meeting today is an important stepping stone towards adapting the Alliance’s military strategic posture. We are working to ensure that our Allied forces maintain the high levels of readiness and coherence needed to conduct NATO’s full range of missions, including deterring aggression against NATO Allies and demonstrating preparedness to defend NATO territory.
  2. The Readiness Action Plan, approved by Heads of State and Government, provides a coherent and comprehensive package of necessary measures to respond to the challenges posed by Russia and their strategic implications, as well as to the risks and threats emanating from our southern neighbourhood, the Middle East and North Africa.  The Plan strengthens NATO’s collective defence and also its crisis management capability. Defensive in nature, the measures will contribute to ensuring that NATO remains a ready, robust and responsive Alliance capable of meeting current and future challenges from wherever they may arise, and that NATO has the right forces in the right place at the right time.
  3. The implementation of the Plan is well underway, and we have achieved considerable progress since the Wales Summit.  The Alliance has increased the presence of land, maritime and air forces in the eastern part of its territory. These Assurance Measures initiated in May last year are continuing through 2015, as planned. They demonstrate Alliance resolve and solidarity.  All Allies are contributing to this effort – 28 for 28.
  4. We have also made progress on Adaptation Measures to bolster NATO’s readiness and responsiveness. Today, we agreed to enhance the NATO Response Force, which will become a division size joint force with significantly increased readiness and highly capable and flexible multinational forces. These will be trained and organised to rapidly respond to a variety of contingencies. In addition to air and maritime components and Special Operations Forces, its flagship element will be a new Very High Readiness Joint Task Force (VJTF), centred on a multinational brigade with up to five manoeuvre battalions with some elements ready to move within 2to 3 days. We welcome the declaration of France, Germany, Italy, Poland, Spain and the United Kingdom to assume the role of a framework nation for rotations of this force in the coming years. We also welcome the availability of the Interim VJTF capability for 2015 led by Germany, the Netherlands and Norway, with some other Allies participating, which has already started training and exercising. We also welcome the efforts of other Allies contributing to enhancing the NRF by raising the readiness of their forces.  Furthermore, initial work has already commenced on adaptation with regard to the south.
  5. In addition, we decided on the immediate establishment of the first six multinational command and control elements – the NATO Force Integration Units (NFIUs) – on the territories of Bulgaria, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland and Romania initially, which constitute a visible and persistent NATO presence in these countries.  They will facilitate the rapid deployment of Allied forces to the region; support collective defence planning; and assist in the coordination of multinational training and exercises.
  6. We welcome the work of Denmark, Germany and Poland to develop the Headquarters Multinational Corps Northeast to provide an additional high readiness capability to command forces deployed to the Baltic states and Poland, if so required, and to enhance its role as a hub for regional cooperation.  We also welcome Romania’s intention to make available a new deployable Multinational Divisional Headquarters as Multinational Division Southeast.
  7. Today, we reiterate the commitment of our nations to Alliance solidarity and the security and protection of our populations and territories.  We will continue reviewing the implementation of the Readiness Action Plan and take further decisions at our coming meetings, in line with the decisions taken at the Wales Summit.

Statement of Foreign Ministers on the Readiness Action Plan[5]

Today, we the Allied Foreign Ministers met to review implementation of the Readiness Action Plan. This has been the first high-level political meeting after the Wales Summit. We welcome progress achieved in delivering on the decisions taken by our Heads of State and Government.

The Readiness Action Plan agreed by Heads of State and Government at the Wales Summit is a response to the changed and broader security environment in and near Europe. It responds to the challenges posed by Russia and their strategic implications. It also responds to the risks and threats emanating from our southern neighbourhood, the Middle East and North Africa. Its implementation will significantly enhance NATO’s readiness and responsiveness and will contribute to ensuring that NATO forces remain ready and able to respond swiftly and firmly to current and future challenges to the Alliance. It will strengthen both NATO’s collective defence and crisis management capability.

Implementation of the Plan is well underway. Today, we reiterate the commitment of our nations to ensuring that NATO remains a strong, ready, robust and responsive Alliance. There is already an increased presence of NATO maritime, land and air forces and meaningful military activity in the eastern part of Alliance territory. All Allies are contributing to this defensive effort and they will continuously rotate air, maritime and land forces in the region and conduct additional exercises, 28 for 28, through 2015. This provides the fundamental baseline requirement for assurance and deterrence. These forces are effectively responding to increased Russian military activity, including through monitoring Russian military flights and maintaining the integrity and safety of our airspace. At the same time, we are enhancing the NATO Response Force’s capabilities, including through the development of a new Very High Readiness Joint Task Force, the VJTF. We welcome the establishment of an interim VJTF coordinated by SACEUR with forces predominantly from Germany, Norway and the Netherlands, available to the Alliance early in 2015.

Work on the other measures envisaged in the Readiness Action Plan is advancing rapidly, including on the establishment of an appropriate multinational command and control presence on the territories of the Eastern Allies. NATO Defence Ministers will further assess progress and take decisions, when they meet in February 2015, on enhancing the Alliance’s readiness and responsiveness as part of the adaptation of NATO to the changed security environment, in line with the decisions taken at the Wales Summit.


Active Engagement, Modern Defence

Strategic Concept for the Defence and Security of the Members of the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation adopted by Heads of State and Government in Lisbon


We, the Heads of State and Government of the NATO nations, are determined that NATO will continue to play its unique and essential role in ensuring our common defence and security. This Strategic Concept will guide the next phase in NATO’s evolution, so that it continues to be effective in a changing world, against new threats, with new capabilities and new partners:

  • It reconfirms the bond between our nations to defend one another against attack, including against new threats to the safety of our citizens.
  • It commits the Alliance to prevent crises, manage conflicts and stabilize post-conflict situations, including by working more closely with our international partners, most importantly the United Nations and the European Union.
  • It offers our partners around the globe more political engagement with the Alliance, and a substantial role in shaping the NATO-led operations to which they contribute.
  • It commits NATO to the goal of creating the conditions for a world without nuclear weapons – but reconfirms that, as long as there are nuclear weapons in the world, NATO will remain a nuclear Alliance.
  • It restates our firm commitment to keep the door to NATO open to all European democracies that meet the standards of membership, because enlargement contributes to our goal of a Europe whole, free and at peace.
  • It commits NATO to continuous reform towards a more effective, efficient and flexible Alliance, so that our taxpayers get the most security for the money they invest in defence.

The citizens of our countries rely on NATO to defend Allied nations, to deploy robust military forces where and when required for our security, and to help promote common security with our partners around the globe. While the world is changing, NATO’s essential mission will remain the same: to ensure that the Alliance remains an unparalleled community of freedom, peace, security and shared values.

Core Tasks and Principles

  1. NATO’s fundamental and enduring purpose is to safeguard the freedom and security of all its members by political and military means. Today, the Alliance remains an essential source of stability in an unpredictable world.
  2. NATO member states form a unique community of values, committed to the principles of individual liberty, democracy, human rights and the rule of law. The Alliance is firmly committed to the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations, and to the Washington Treaty, which affirms the primary responsibility of the Security Council for the maintenance of international peace and security.
  3. The political and military bonds between Europe and North America have been forged in NATO since the Alliance was founded in 1949; the transatlantic link remains as strong, and as important to the preservation of Euro-Atlantic peace and security, as ever. The security of NATO members on both sides of the Atlantic is indivisible. We will continue to defend it together, on the basis of solidarity, shared purpose and fair burden-sharing.
  4. The modern security environment contains a broad and evolving set of challenges to the security of NATO’s territory and populations. In order to assure their security, the Alliance must and will continue fulfilling effectively three essential core tasks, all of which contribute to safeguarding Alliance members, and always in accordance with international law:
    1. Collective defence. NATO members will always assist each other against attack, in accordance with Article 5 of the Washington Treaty. That commitment remains firm and binding. NATO will deter and defend against any threat of aggression, and against emerging security challenges where they threaten the fundamental security of individual Allies or the Alliance as a whole.
    2. Crisis management. NATO has a unique and robust set of political and military capabilities to address the full spectrum of crises – before, during and after conflicts. NATO will actively employ an appropriate mix of those political and military tools to help manage developing crises that have the potential to affect Alliance security, before they escalate into conflicts; to stop ongoing conflicts where they affect Alliance security; and to help consolidate stability in post-conflict situations where that contributes to Euro-Atlantic security.
    3. Cooperative security. The Alliance is affected by, and can affect, political and security developments beyond its borders. The Alliance will engage actively to enhance international security, through partnership with relevant countries and other international organisations; by contributing actively to arms control, non-proliferation and disarmament; and by keeping the door to membership in the Alliance open to all European democracies that meet NATO’s standards.
  5. NATO remains the unique and essential transatlantic forum for consultations on all matters that affect the territorial integrity, political independence and security of its members, as set out in Article 4 of the Washington Treaty. Any security issue of interest to any Ally can be brought to the NATO table, to share information, exchange views and, where appropriate, forge common approaches.
  6. In order to carry out the full range of NATO missions as effectively and efficiently as possible, Allies will engage in a continuous process of reform, modernisation and transformation.

The Security Environment

  1. Today, the Euro-Atlantic area is at peace and the threat of a conventional attack against NATO territory is low. That is an historic success for the policies of robust defence, Euro-Atlantic integration and active partnership that have guided NATO for more than half a century.
  2. However, the conventional threat cannot be ignored. Many regions and countries around the world are witnessing the acquisition of substantial, modern military capabilities with consequences for international stability and Euro-Atlantic security that are difficult to predict. This includes the proliferation of ballistic missiles, which poses a real and growing threat to the Euro-Atlantic area.
  3. The proliferation of nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction, and their means of delivery, threatens incalculable consequences for global stability and prosperity. During the next decade, proliferation will be most acute in some of the world’s most volatile regions.
  4. Terrorism poses a direct threat to the security of the citizens of NATO countries, and to international stability and prosperity more broadly. Extremist groups continue to spread to, and in, areas of strategic importance to the Alliance, and modern technology increases the threat and potential impact of terrorist attacks, in particular if terrorists were to acquire nuclear, chemical, biological or radiological capabilities.
  5. Instability or conflict beyond NATO borders can directly threaten Alliance security, including by fostering extremism, terrorism, and trans-national illegal activities such as trafficking in arms, narcotics and people.
  6. Cyber attacks are becoming more frequent, more organised and more costly in the damage that they inflict on government administrations, businesses, economies and potentially also transportation and supply networks and other critical infrastructure; they can reach a threshold that threatens national and Euro-Atlantic prosperity, security and stability. Foreign militaries and intelligence services, organised criminals, terrorist and/or extremist groups can each be the source of such attacks.
  7. All countries are increasingly reliant on the vital communication, transport and transit routes on which international trade, energy security and prosperity depend. They require greater international efforts to ensure their resilience against attack or disruption. Some NATO countries will become more dependent on foreign energy suppliers and in some cases, on foreign energy supply and distribution networks for their energy needs. As a larger share of world consumption is transported across the globe, energy supplies are increasingly exposed to disruption.
  8. A number of significant technology-related trends – including the development of laser weapons, electronic warfare and technologies that impede access to space – appear poised to have major global effects that will impact on NATO military planning and operations.
  9. Key environmental and resource constraints, including health risks, climate change, water scarcity and increasing energy needs will further shape the future security environment in areas of concern to NATO and have the potential to significantly affect NATO planning and operations.

Defence and Deterrence

  1. The greatest responsibility of the Alliance is to protect and defend our territory and our populations against attack, as set out in Article 5 of the Washington Treaty. The Alliance does not consider any country to be its adversary. However, no one should doubt NATO’s resolve if the security of any of its members were to be threatened.
  2. Deterrence, based on an appropriate mix of nuclear and conventional capabilities, remains a core element of our overall strategy. The circumstances in which any use of nuclear weapons might have to be contemplated are extremely remote. As long as nuclear weapons exist, NATO will remain a nuclear alliance.
  3. The supreme guarantee of the security of the Allies is provided by the strategic nuclear forces of the Alliance, particularly those of the United States; the independent strategic nuclear forces of the United Kingdom and France, which have a deterrent role of their own, contribute to the overall deterrence and security of the Allies.
  4. We will ensure that NATO has the full range of capabilities necessary to deter and defend against any threat to the safety and security of our populations. Therefore, we will:
    • maintain an appropriate mix of nuclear and conventional forces;
    • maintain the ability to sustain concurrent major joint operations and several smaller operations for collective defence and crisis response, including at strategic distance;
    • develop and maintain robust, mobile and deployable conventional forces to carry out both our Article 5 responsibilities and the Alliance’s expeditionary operations, including with the NATO Response Force;
    • carry out the necessary training, exercises, contingency planning and information exchange for assuring our defence against the full range of conventional and emerging security challenges, and provide appropriate visible assurance and reinforcement for all Allies;
    • ensure the broadest possible participation of Allies in collective defence planning on nuclear roles, in peacetime basing of nuclear forces, and in command, control and consultation arrangements;
    • develop the capability to defend our populations and territories against ballistic missile attack as a core element of our collective defence, which contributes to the indivisible security of the Alliance. We will actively seek cooperation on missile defence with Russia and other Euro-Atlantic partners;
    • further develop NATO’s capacity to defend against the threat of chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear weapons of mass destruction;
    • develop further our ability to prevent, detect, defend against and recover from cyber-attacks, including by using the NATO planning process to enhance and coordinate national cyber-defence capabilities, bringing all NATO bodies under centralized cyber protection, and better integrating NATO cyber awareness, warning and response with member nations;
    • enhance the capacity to detect and defend against international terrorism, including through enhanced analysis of the threat, more consultations with our partners, and the development of appropriate military capabilities, including to help train local forces to fight terrorism themselves;
    • develop the capacity to contribute to energy security, including protection of critical energy infrastructure and transit areas and lines, cooperation with partners, and consultations among Allies on the basis of strategic assessments and contingency planning;
    • ensure that the Alliance is at the front edge in assessing the security impact of emerging technologies, and that military planning takes the potential threats into account;
    • sustain the necessary levels of defence spending, so that our armed forces are sufficiently resourced;
    • continue to review NATO’s overall posture in deterring and defending against the full range of threats to the Alliance, taking into account changes to the evolving international security environment.

Security through Crisis Management

  1. Crises and conflicts beyond NATO’s borders can pose a direct threat to the security of Alliance territory and populations. NATO will therefore engage, where possible and when necessary, to prevent crises, manage crises, stabilize post-conflict situations and support reconstruction.
  2. The lessons learned from NATO operations, in particular in Afghanistan and the Western Balkans, make it clear that a comprehensive political, civilian and military approach is necessary for effective crisis management. The Alliance will engage actively with other international actors before, during and after crises to encourage collaborative analysis, planning and conduct of activities on the ground, in order to maximise coherence and effectiveness of the overall international effort.
  3. The best way to manage conflicts is to prevent them from happening. NATO will continually monitor and analyse the international environment to anticipate crises and, where appropriate, take active steps to prevent them from becoming larger conflicts.
  4. Where conflict prevention proves unsuccessful, NATO will be prepared and capable to manage ongoing hostilities. NATO has unique conflict management capacities, including the unparalleled capability to deploy and sustain robust military forces in the field. NATO-led operations have demonstrated the indispensable contribution the Alliance can make to international conflict management efforts.
  5. Even when conflict comes to an end, the international community must often provide continued support, to create the conditions for lasting stability. NATO will be prepared and capable to contribute to stabilisation and reconstruction, in close cooperation and consultation wherever possible with other relevant international actors.
  6. To be effective across the crisis management spectrum, we will:
    • enhance intelligence sharing within NATO, to better predict when crises might occur, and how they can best be prevented;
    • further develop doctrine and military capabilities for expeditionary operations, including counterinsurgency, stabilization and reconstruction operations;
    • form an appropriate but modest civilian crisis management capability to interface more effectively with civilian partners, building on the lessons learned from NATO-led operations. This capability may also be used to plan, employ and coordinate civilian activities until conditions allow for the transfer of those responsibilities and tasks to other actors;
    • enhance integrated civilian-military planning throughout the crisis spectrum,
    • develop the capability to train and develop local forces in crisis zones, so that local authorities are able, as quickly as possible, to maintain security without international assistance;
    • identify and train civilian specialists from member states, made available for rapid deployment by Allies for selected missions, able to work alongside our military personnel and civilian specialists from partner countries and institutions;
    • broaden and intensify the political consultations among Allies, and with partners, both on a regular basis and in dealing with all stages of a crisis – before, during and after.

Promoting International Security through Cooperation

Arms Control, Disarmament, and Non-Proliferation
  1. NATO seeks its security at the lowest possible level of forces. Arms control, disarmament and non-proliferation contribute to peace, security and stability, and should ensure undiminished security for all Alliance members. We will continue to play our part in reinforcing arms control and in promoting disarmament of both conventional weapons and weapons of mass destruction, as well as non-proliferation efforts:
    • We are resolved to seek a safer world for all and to create the conditions for a world without nuclear weapons in accordance with the goals of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, in a way that promotes international stability, and is based on the principle of undiminished security for all.
    • With the changes in the security environment since the end of the Cold War, we have dramatically reduced the number of nuclear weapons stationed in Europe and our reliance on nuclear weapons in NATO strategy. We will seek to create the conditions for further reductions in the future.
    • In any future reductions, our aim should be to seek Russian agreement to increase transparency on its nuclear weapons in Europe and relocate these weapons away from the territory of NATO members. Any further steps must take into account the disparity with the greater Russian stockpiles of short-range nuclear weapons.
    • We are committed to conventional arms control, which provides predictability, transparency and a means to keep armaments at the lowest possible level for stability. We will work to strengthen the conventional arms control regime in Europe on the basis of reciprocity, transparency and host-nation consent.
    • We will explore ways for our political means and military capabilities to contribute to international efforts to fight proliferation.
    • National decisions regarding arms control and disarmament may have an impact on the security of all Alliance members. We are committed to maintain, and develop as necessary, appropriate consultations among Allies on these issues.
Open Door
  1. NATO’s enlargement has contributed substantially to the security of Allies; the prospect of further enlargement and the spirit of cooperative security have advanced stability in Europe more broadly. Our goal of a Europe whole and free, and sharing common values, would be best served by the eventual integration of all European countries that so desire into Euro-Atlantic structures.
    • The door to NATO membership remains fully open to all European democracies which share the values of our Alliance, which are willing and able to assume the responsibilities and obligations of membership, and whose inclusion can contribute to common security and stability.
  1. The promotion of Euro-Atlantic security is best assured through a wide network of partner relationships with countries and organisations around the globe. These partnerships make a concrete and valued contribution to the success of NATO’s fundamental tasks.
  2. Dialogue and cooperation with partners can make a concrete contribution to enhancing international security, to defending the values on which our Alliance is based, to NATO’s operations, and to preparing interested nations for membership of NATO. These relationships will be based on reciprocity, mutual benefit and mutual respect.
  3. We will enhance our partnerships through flexible formats that bring NATO and partners together – across and beyond existing frameworks:
    • We are prepared to develop political dialogue and practical cooperation with any nations and relevant organisations across the globe that share our interest in peaceful international relations.
    • We will be open to consultation with any partner country on security issues of common concern.
    • We will give our operational partners a structural role in shaping strategy and decisions on NATO-led missions to which they contribute.
    • We will further develop our existing partnerships while preserving their specificity.
  4. Cooperation between NATO and the United Nations continues to make a substantial contribution to security in operations around the world. The Alliance aims to deepen political dialogue and practical cooperation with the UN, as set out in the UN-NATO Declaration signed in 2008, including through:
    • enhanced liaison between the two Headquarters;
    • more regular political consultation; and
    • enhanced practical cooperation in managing crises where both organisations are engaged.
  5. An active and effective European Union contributes to the overall security of the Euro-Atlantic area. Therefore the EU is a unique and essential partner for NATO. The two organisations share a majority of members, and all members of both organisations share common values. NATO recognizes the importance of a stronger and more capable European defence. We welcome the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty, which provides a framework for strengthening the EU’s capacities to address common security challenges. Non-EU Allies make a significant contribution to these efforts. For the strategic partnership between NATO and the EU, their fullest involvement in these efforts is essential. NATO and the EU can and should play complementary and mutually reinforcing roles in supporting international peace and security. We are determined to make our contribution to create more favourable circumstances through which we will:
    • fully strengthen the strategic partnership with the EU, in the spirit of full mutual openness, transparency, complementarity and respect for the autonomy and institutional integrity of both organisations;
    • enhance our practical cooperation in operations throughout the crisis spectrum, from coordinated planning to mutual support in the field;
    • broaden our political consultations to include all issues of common concern, in order to share assessments and perspectives;
    • cooperate more fully in capability development, to minimise duplication and maximise cost-effectiveness.
  6. NATO-Russia cooperation is of strategic importance as it contributes to creating a common space of peace, stability and security. NATO poses no threat to Russia. On the contrary: we want to see a true strategic partnership between NATO and Russia, and we will act accordingly, with the expectation of reciprocity from Russia.
  7. The NATO-Russia relationship is based upon the goals, principles and commitments of the NATO-Russia Founding Act and the Rome Declaration, especially regarding the respect of democratic principles and the sovereignty, independence and territorial integrity of all states in the Euro-Atlantic area. Notwithstanding differences on particular issues, we remain convinced that the security of NATO and Russia is intertwined and that a strong and constructive partnership based on mutual confidence, transparency and predictability can best serve our security. We are determined to:
    • enhance the political consultations and practical cooperation with Russia in areas of shared interests, including missile defence, counter-terrorism, counter-narcotics, counter-piracy and the promotion of wider international security;
    • use the full potential of the NATO-Russia Council for dialogue and joint action with Russia.
  8. The Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council and Partnership for Peace are central to our vision of Europe whole, free and in peace. We are firmly committed to the development of friendly and cooperative relations with all countries of the Mediterranean, and we intend to further develop the Mediterranean Dialogue in the coming years. We attach great importance to peace and stability in the Gulf region, and we intend to strengthen our cooperation in the Istanbul Cooperation Initiative. We will aim to:
    • enhance consultations and practical military cooperation with our partners in the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council;
    • continue and develop the partnerships with Ukraine and Georgia within the NATO-Ukraine and NATO-Georgia Commissions, based on the NATO decision at the Bucharest summit 2008, and taking into account the Euro-Atlantic orientation or aspiration of each of the countries;
    • facilitate the Euro-Atlantic integration of the Western Balkans, with the aim to ensure lasting peace and stability based on democratic values, regional cooperation and good neighbourly relations;
    • deepen the cooperation with current members of the Mediterranean Dialogue and be open to the inclusion in the Mediterranean Dialogue of other countries of the region;
    • develop a deeper security partnership with our Gulf partners and remain ready to welcome new partners in the Istanbul Cooperation Initiative.
Reform and Transformation
  1. Unique in history, NATO is a security Alliance that fields military forces able to operate together in any environment; that can control operations anywhere through its integrated military command structure; and that has at its disposal core capabilities that few Allies could afford individually.
  2. NATO must have sufficient resources – financial, military and human – to carry out its missions, which are essential to the security of Alliance populations and territory. Those resources must, however, be used in the most efficient and effective way possible. We will:
    • maximise the deployability of our forces, and their capacity to sustain operations in the field, including by undertaking focused efforts to meet NATO’s usability targets;
    • ensure the maximum coherence in defence planning, to reduce unnecessary duplication, and to focus our capability development on modern requirements;
    • develop and operate capabilities jointly, for reasons of cost-effectiveness and as a manifestation of solidarity;
    • preserve and strengthen the common capabilities, standards, structures and funding that bind us together;
    • engage in a process of continual reform, to streamline structures, improve working methods and maximise efficiency.
An Alliance for the 21st Century
  1. We, the political leaders of NATO, are determined to continue renewal of our Alliance so that it is fit for purpose in addressing the 21st Century security challenges. We are firmly committed to preserve its effectiveness as the globe’s most successful political-military Alliance. Our Alliance thrives as a source of hope because it is based on common values of individual liberty, democracy, human rights and the rule of law, and because our common essential and enduring purpose is to safeguard the freedom and security of its members. These values and objectives are universal and perpetual, and we are determined to defend them through unity, solidarity, strength and resolve.


The New Interventionism: Low-Intensity Warfare in the 1980s and Beyond.

Michael T. Klare and Peter Kornbluh.

From the book
Low Intensity Warfare published by KEN incorporated – Philippines, 1988[6]

Twenty-five years after the doctrine of “counterinsurgency” transformed American military thinking and swept the nation into the Vietnam War, a new strategy of intervention is ascending in Washington: the Reagan administration’s aggressive doctrine of “low-intensity conflict,” or “LIC” as it is known in Pentagon circles. LIC begins with counterinsurgency, and extends to a wide variety of other politico-military operations, both overt and covert. For U.S. policy-makers and war planners, however, low-intensity conflict has come to mean far more than a specialized category of armed struggle; it represents a strategic reorientation of the U.S. military establishment, and a renewed commitment to employ force in a global crusade against Third World revolutionary movements and governments.

In the mind-set of many senior officials, the decisive battle of this century is now unfolding in this “long twilight struggle” between America’s LIC warriors and the revolutionary combatants of the Third World. Theirs is an outlook that identifies Third World insurgencies- and not Soviet troop concentrations in Europe-as the predominant threat to U.S. security; it is, moreover, an outlook that calls on the United States to “take the offensive”-in contrast to the passive stance of “deterrence” – to overcome the revolutionary peril. Indeed, LIC has become the battle cry of the late Reagan era-a clarion call for resurgent U.S. intervention abroad.

In justifying the new interventionism, LIC advocates invariably begin with a grim assessment of the global political and military environment. “The plain fact is that the United States is at war,” military expert Neil C..Livingstone told senior officers at the National Defense University in 1983, and “nothing less than the survival of our country and way of life” is at stake in that struggle. This is not, however, warfare in the classic sense of armies fighting armies on a common battlefield. “The most plausible scenario for the future,” he affirmed, is that of “a continuous succession of hostage crises, peacekeeping operations, rescue missions, and counterinsurgency efforts, or what some have called ‘low frontier warfare.’ ” This being the case, it is essential “that the American people and our policy-makers be educated as to the realities of contemporary conflict and the need to fight little wars successfully.”

Today, this outlook reflects the prevailing mind-set within the national security bureaucracy. “It is very important for the American people to know that this is a dangerous world; that we live at risk and that this nation is at risk in a dangerous world,” Lieutenant Colonel Oliver North, director of the National Security Council’s Counterterrorism and Low-lntensity Warfare Group, told the Joint House-Senate Select Committee on Iran and the Contras in July 1987.3 Similar views were expressed by Secretary of Defense Caspar Weinberger in his 1987 annual report to Congress: “Today there seems to be no shortage of adversaries who seek to undermine our security by persistently nibbling away at our interests through these shadow wars carried on by guerrillas assassins, terrorists, and subversives in the hope that they have found a weak point in our defenses.” Unless the United States adopted a comprehensive “national strategy” to combat low-level wars, he asserted, “these forms of aggression will remain-the most likely and the most enduring threats to our security.”

To meet this perceived threat, the United States has now begun to transform its national security apparatus-to rethink, reorganize, and rearm for current and future engagements in the Third World. In January 1986, Secretary Weinberger hosted the Pentagon’s first “Low lntensity Warfare Conference” at Fort Lesley J. McNair in Washington, D.C. That same month, the Army/Air Force Center for Low-lntensity Conflict (CLIC) was established “to improve the Army/ Air Force posture for engaging in low-intensity conflict [and to] elevate awareness throughout the Army/Air Force of the role of military power in low-intensity conflict.” In addition, a Joint Low-lntensity Conflict Project (JLIC) was established in 1985 and one year later released a two-volume, thousand-page Final Report on the concepts, strategy, guidelines, and application of low-level war-fighting doctrine. in the Third World.

These initiatives have been accompanied by a major overhaul of America’s war-making capability. To provide Washington with an enhanced capacity for counter-guerrilla and “unconventional” operations, as Stephen Goose shows in Chapter 4, .the Reagan administration has ordered a 100 percent increase in the Pentagon’s “Special Operations Forces” (SOF)-the Army’s “Green Berets,” the Navy’s “SEALs” and other elite commando formations. For covert operations of the sort managed by Lieutenant Colonel North of the NSC, there is the supersecret “Delta Force,” the 160th Army Aviation Task Force (“the Night Stalkers”), and other paramilitary “assets” controlled by the Central Intelligence Agency. And, for more demanding military engagements, there are the four new light infantry divisions (LlDs) established by the Department of the Army since 1984.

More important, in the Pentagon’s view, is the development of an appropriate doctrine. for low-intensity operations. By focusing on the Soviet military threat in Europe, it is argued, present doctrine has left U.S. troops wholly unprepared for the unconventional challenges they are likely to face on Third World battlefields. “Given the proposition that low-intensity conflict is our most likely form of involvement in the Third World,” LIC proponent Colonel John D. Waghelstein wrote in 1985, “it appears that the army is still preparing for the wrong war by emphasizing the Soviet threat on the plains of Europe.” To ready U.S. forces for the “right” war, Waghelstein and other senior officers have crusaded for the rapid introduction of specialized strategy and tactics. For American troops to prevail in low-intensity warfare, Colonel James B. Motley wrote in Military Review, “the United States should reorient its forces and traditional policies away from an almost exclusive concentration on NATO to better influence politico-military outcomes in the resource-rich and strategically located Third World areas.”

Because the challenge posed by Third World revolution is politics as much as it is military in nature, the U.S. response must, according to the Pentagon, be equally comprehensive. “Low-intensity conflicts cannot be won or even contained by military power alone,” General Donald R. Morelli and Major Michael M. Ferguson of the U/.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command affirmed in 1984. “It requires the sychronized application of-all elements of national power across the entire range of conditions which are the sources of the conflict.”

The foundation of LIC doctrine lies in the “counterinsurgency” programs the coordinated integration of economic assistance with psychological operations and security measures-developed for Latin America after the 1959 Cuban revolution, and for South Vietnam in the early 1960s. “Counterinsurgency is the old name for low-intensity conflict,” according to Colonel Waghelstein, former head of the U.S. military group in El Salvador. However … the Reagan administration has gone beyond counterinsurgency as it was seen twenty-five years ago by publicly committing the United States to a policy of undermining not just revolutionary movements coming into being, but also revolutionary regimes which already exist and are perceived as allies of the Soviet Union. A modernized version of John Foster Dulles’s concept of “rollback” in a counterinsurgency guise, the “Reagan Doctrine” pro claims a “global offensive against communism at the fringes of the Soviet Empire.” According to the president, “the tide of Soviet communism can be reversed. All it takes is the will and the resources to get the job done.”

Under Reagan, LIC doctrine has been institutionalized in the national security bureaucracy. In early 1987, the president signed legislation that created a unified command for special operations and established a “Board for Low Intensity Conflict” within the National Security Council. It also mandated a new bureaucratic position-deputy assistant to the president for low-intensity conflict. And, in June 1987, Mr. Reagan signed a highly classified National Security Decision Directive (NSDD) that authorizes the bureaucracy to develop and implement a unified national strategy for low-intensity warfare.

“How does one begin to bring understanding to this complex issue?” asks the Joint Low-lntensity Conflict Project Final Report. The term itself derives from the Pentagon’s image of the “spectrum of conflict”- a theoretical division of armed conflict into “low,” “medium” and “high” levels, depending on the degree of force and violence. Guerrilla wars and other limited conflicts fought with irregular units are labeled “low-intensity conflicts” (even though the impact of such wars on underdeveloped Third World countries, like El Salvador, can be quite devastating); regional wars fought with modern weapons (such as the Iran / lraq conflict) are considered “mid-intensity conflicts”; and a global nonnuclear conflagration (like World Wars I and 11) or a nuclear engagement fall into the “high-intensity”. category.

For the Pentagon, however, the definition of LIC encompasses more than a category of violence: “It is, first, an environment in which conflict occurs and, second, a series of diverse civil-military activities and operations which are conducted in that environment.” So deliberately broad and ambiguous is the official description of low-intensity warfare that it embraces drug interdiction in Bolivia, the occupation of Beirut, the invasion of Grenada, and the 1986 air strikes on Libya. Also included are a wide range of covert political and psychological operations variously described as “special operations,” “special activities,” and “unconventional warfare.”

But while military strategists depict LIC as a war for all seasons, in essence it is a doctrine for countering revolution. The “LIC pie,” as Pentagon insiders call it, is largely divided between counterinsurgency and proinsurgency operations-what the /LIC Final Report describes as “diplomatic, economic and military support for either a government under attack by insurgents or an insurgent force seeking freedom from an adversary government.” In other words, LIC doctrine is meant to be applied in countries such as El Salvador, Nicaragua, the Philippines, Angola, Cambodia, and Afghanistan, where the United States is either trying to bolster a client government against a revolutionary upheaval or fostering a counterrevolutionary / insurgency against an unfriendly Third World regime.


We must also recognize that the growing worldwide availability of high-tech conventional weapons is systematically eroding the gap between “low-” and “mid-intensity conflict,” and likewise between “mid-” and “high-intensity conflict.” As the 1987 Iraqi missile attack on the USS Stark demonstrated, our major military systems are highly vulnerable to sophisticated weapons of the sort now possessed by many Third World nations. Previously, as noted by two Army theorists in Military Review, distinctly different forces and weapons were developed for each type of warfare; today, “with the greater dispersion, increased kill probabilities and improved mobility [of modern weapons], those types of war along the spectrum of conflict may be more similar than they are dissimilar.” What this means, of course, is that a war that starts out as “low-intensity conflict” can escalate overnight to the “mid” or “high” category-a risk that is particularly acute in the highly militarized Persian Gulf area. As Selig Harrison suggests in Chapter 8, moreover, low-intensity conflict can lead to a U.S.-Soviet confrontation, if intervention by one superpower invites countermoves by the other (as has occurred in Afghanistan) and triggers an uncontrolled spiral of escalation.

Turning to the domestic political consequences of the new interventionism, we can see a variety of threats to American rights and liberties. First and foremost in the threat to public information. LIC theorists have made no secret of their belief that an active press and Congress represent a significant obstacle to military effectiveness. “The United States will never win a war fought daily in the U.S. media or on the floor of Congress,” Livingstone told senior officers at the National Defense University. Similarly, Colonel North went out of his way to justify the concealment of information-even from the appropriate committees of Congress-on covert LIC operations abroad.

But the public’s access to information is only one casualty of the war at home… any sustained effort to mislead and circumvent Congress poses a serious threat to the integrity of the constitutional process. If the Executive considers itself above the law, and NSC operatives are authorized to conduct an independent foreign policy, then we can no longer rely on the checks and balances that are our ultimate safeguard against tyranny. Just how vulnerable these protections have become was dramatically revealed in Colonel North’s July 10, 1987, testimony, when he disclosed that former CIA Director William J. Casey had proposed the establishment of an “off-the-shelf, self-sustaining, stand-alone entity” that could perform covert political and military operations without accountability to Congress. “If you carry this to its logical extreme,” Senator Warren B. Rudman observed two days later, “you don’t have a democracy anymore.”

And not only democracy is at risk, but also our basic moral values. While U.S. Ieaders always claim that they seek to promote American values when authorizing military intervention abroad, the outcome is often quite another matter… U.S. support for counterrevolution inevitably risks American entanglement in the repressive behavior of Third World autocrats and their heavy-handed security forces. Once committed to the survival of these regimes, we often compound our sins by failing to curb blatant abuses or worse, by telling ourselves that occasional atrocities can be overlooked in the name of “democracy.” From there, it is but a short distance to the view that any means are justified in the pursuit of victory, even the wholesale liquidation of civilian communities. Thus, however assiduously Washington seeks to minimize the risks, deepened U.S. involvement in low-intensity conflict abroad could impose intolerable strains on the moral fabric of the nation.

In their preface to the LIC Final Report, the members of the Joint Low-lntensity Conflict Project affirm that their intention was to initiate an “enlightened debate” on, the type of conflict most likely to engage American forces in the years ahead. “In this sense,” they affirmed, the Final Report “is not a prescription but an invitation.” In editing this book, the authors have taken up this invitation. We believe that the essays contained herein represent an important contribution to an “enlightened debate” on low-intensity conflict. But we do not believe that the debate is now concluded; there are too many aspects of low-intensity conflict-some still only dimly understood-and too many risks to leave it at that. Only through a broad and open discussion of LIC theory and practice can the American citizens make intelligent decisions on policies that are likely to affect our lives and liberties for many years to come.

национальной безопасности Российской Федерации до 2020 года[7]

  1. Внимание международной политики на долгосрочную перспективу будет сосредоточено на обладании источниками энергоресурсов, в том числе на Ближнем Востоке, на шельфе Баренцева моря и в других районах Арктики, в бассейне Каспийского моря и в Центральной Азии. Негативное воздействие на международную обстановку в среднесрочной перспективе будут по-прежнему оказывать ситуация в Ираке и Афганистане, конфликты на Ближнем и Среднем Востоке, в ряде стран Южной Азии и Африки, на Корейском полуострове.
  2. Критическое состояние физической сохранности опасных материалов и объектов, особенно в странах с нестабильной внутриполитической ситуацией, а также не контролируемое государствами распространение обычных вооружений могут привести к обострению существующих и возникновению новых региональных и межгосударственных конфликтов.

В условиях конкурентной борьбы за ресурсы не исключены решения возникающих проблем с применением военной силы – может быть нарушен сложившийся баланс сил вблизи границ Российской Федерации и границ ее союзников.

Возрастет риск увеличения числа государств – обладателей ядерного оружия.

Возможности поддержания глобальной и региональной стабильности существенно сузятся при размещении в Европе элементов глобальной системы противоракетной обороны Соединенных Штатов Америки.


При этом Организация Договора о коллективной безопасности рассматривается в качестве главного межгосударственного инструмента, призванного противостоять региональным вызовам и угрозам военно-политического и военно-стратегического характера, включая борьбу с незаконным оборотом наркотических средств и психотропных веществ.

  1. Россия будет способствовать укреплению Евразийского экономического сообщества в качестве ядра экономической интеграции, инструмента содействия реализации крупных водно-энергетических, инфраструктурных, промышленных и других совместных проектов, в первую очередь регионального значения.
  2. Для России особое значение будут иметь укрепление политического потенциала Шанхайской организации сотрудничества, стимулирование в ее рамках практических шагов, способствующих укреплению взаимного доверия и партнерства в Центрально-Азиатском регионе.
  3. Российская Федерация выступает за всемерное укрепление механизмов взаимодействия с Европейским союзом, включая последовательное формирование общих пространств в сферах экономики, внешней и внутренней безопасности, образования, науки, культуры. Долгосрочным национальным интересам России отвечает формирование в Евроатлантике открытой системы коллективной безопасности на четкой договорно-правовой основе.
  4. Определяющим фактором в отношениях с Организацией Североатлантического договора останется неприемлемость для России планов продвижения военной инфраструктуры альянса к ее границам и попытки придания ему глобальных функций, идущих вразрез с нормами международного права.

Россия готова к развитию отношений с Организацией Североатлантического договора на основе равноправия и в интересах укрепления всеобщей безопасности в Евро-Атлантическом регионе, глубина и содержание которых будут определяться готовностью альянса к учету законных интересов России при осуществлении военно-политического планирования, уважению норм международного права, а также к их дальнейшей трансформации и поиску новых задач и функций гуманистической направленности.

  1. IV. Обеспечение национальной безопасности
  2. Основное содержание обеспечения национальной безопасности состоит в поддержании правовых и институциональных механизмов, а также ресурсных возможностей государства и общества на уровне, отвечающем национальным интересам Российской Федерации.

Состояние национальной безопасности Российской Федерации напрямую зависит от экономического потенциала страны и эффективности функционирования системы обеспечения национальной безопасности.

  1. Национальная оборона


  1. Угрозами военной безопасности являются: политика ряда ведущих зарубежных стран, направленная на достижение преобладающего превосходства в военной сфере, прежде всего в стратегических ядерных силах, путем развития высокоточных, информационных и других высокотехнологичных средств ведения вооруженной борьбы, стратегических вооружений в неядерном оснащении, формирования в одностороннем порядке глобальной системы противоракетной обороны и милитаризации околоземного космического пространства, способных привести к новому витку гонки вооружений, а также на распространение ядерных, химических, биологических технологий, производство оружия массового уничтожения либо его компонентов и средств доставки.

Негативное воздействие на состояние военной безопасности Российской Федерации и ее союзников усугубляется отходом от международных договоренностей в области ограничения и сокращения вооружений, а также действиями, направленными на нарушение устойчивости систем государственного и военного управления, предупреждения о ракетном нападении, контроля космического пространства, функционирования стратегических ядерных сил, объектов хранения ядерных боеприпасов, атомной энергетики, атомной и химической промышленности, других потенциально опасных объектов.

Концепция внешней политики Российской Федерации

Утверждена Президентом Российской Федерации В.В.Путиным
12 февраля 2013 г.[8]

  1. В соответствии с высшим приоритетом национальной безопасности – обеспечением защищенности личности, общества и государства – главные внешнеполитические усилия должны быть сосредоточены на достижении следующих основных целей:

а) обеспечение безопасности страны, сохранение и укрепление ее суверенитета и территориальной целостности, прочных и авторитетных позиций в мировом сообществе, в наибольшей мере отвечающих интересам Российской Федерации как одного из влиятельных и конкурентоспособных центров современного мира;

в) активное продвижение курса на всемерное укрепление международного мира, всеобщей безопасности и стабильности в целях утверждения справедливой и демократической международной системы, основанной на коллективных началах в решении международных проблем, на верховенстве международного права, прежде всего на положениях Устава ООН, а также на равноправных и партнерских отношениях между государствами при центральной координирующей роли ООН как основной организации, регулирующей международные отношения;

г) формирование отношений добрососедства с сопредельными государствами, содействие устранению имеющихся и предотвращению возникновения новых очагов напряженности и конфликтов в прилегающих к Российской Федерации регионах;

д) развитие двусторонних и многосторонних отношений взаимовыгодного и равноправного партнерства с иностранными государствами, межгосударственными объединениями, международными организациями и форумами на основе принципов уважения независимости и суверенитета, прагматизма, транспарентности, многовекторности, предсказуемости, неконфронтационного отстаивания национальных приоритетов. Развертывание широкого и недискриминационного международного сотрудничества, содействие становлению гибких внеблоковых сетевых альянсов, активное участие в них России;

е) укрепление торгово-экономических позиций России в системе мирохозяйственных связей, дипломатическое сопровождение интересов отечественных экономических операторов за рубежом, недопущение дискриминации российских товаров, услуг, инвестиций, использование возможностей международных и региональных экономических и финансовых организаций в этих целях;

ж) всесторонняя защита прав и законных интересов российских граждан и соотечественников, проживающих за рубежом, отстаивание в различных международных форматах российских подходов по теме защиты прав человека;

з) распространение и укрепление позиций русского языка в мире, популяризация культурных достижений народов России, консолидация русской диаспоры за рубежом;





Wales Summit Declaration[1]

Issued by the Heads of State and Government participating in the meeting of the North Atlantic Council in Wales

05 Sep. 2014

  1. We, the Heads of State and Government of the member countries of the North Atlantic Alliance, have gathered in Wales at a pivotal moment in Euro-Atlantic security. Russia’s aggressive actions against Ukraine have fundamentally challenged our vision of a Europe whole, free, and at peace. Growing instability in our southern neighbourhood, from the Middle East to North Africa, as well as transnational and multi-dimensional threats, are also challenging our security. These can all have long-term consequences for peace and security in the Euro-Atlantic region and stability across the globe.
  2. Our Alliance remains an essential source of stability in this unpredictable world. Together as strong democracies, we are united in our commitment to the Washington Treaty and the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations. Based on solidarity, Alliance cohesion, and the indivisibility of our security, NATO remains the transatlantic framework for strong collective defence and the essential forum for security consultations and decisions among Allies. The greatest responsibility of the Alliance is to protect and defend our territories and our populations against attack, as set out in Article 5 of the Washington Treaty. As stated in the Transatlantic Declaration that we issued today, we are committed to further strengthening the transatlantic bond and to providing the resources, capabilities, and political will required to ensure our Alliance remains ready to meet any challenge. We stand ready to act together and decisively to defend freedom and our shared values of individual liberty, human rights, democracy, and the rule of law.
  3. Today we reaffirm our commitment to fulfil all three core tasks set out in our Strategic Concept: collective defence, crisis management, and cooperative security. Here in Wales, we have taken decisions to meet the challenges of today and tomorrow. We are reaffirming our strong commitment to collective defence and to ensuring security and assurance for all Allies; we are adapting our operations, including in Afghanistan, in light of progress made and remaining challenges; and we are strengthening our partnerships with countries and organisations around the globe to better build security together.
  4. Every day, our troops deliver the security that is the foundation of our prosperity and our way of life. We pay tribute to all the brave men and women from Allied and partner nations who have served, and continue to serve, in NATO-led operations and missions. We owe an eternal debt of gratitude to all those who have lost their lives or been injured, and we extend our profound sympathy to their families and loved ones.
  5. In order to ensure that our Alliance is ready to respond swiftly and firmly to the new security challenges, today we have approved the NATO Readiness Action Plan. It provides a coherent and comprehensive package of necessary measures to respond to the changes in the security environment on NATO’s borders and further afield that are of concern to Allies. It responds to the challenges posed by Russia and their strategic implications. It also responds to the risks and threats emanating from our southern neighbourhood, the Middle East and North Africa. The Plan strengthens NATO’s collective defence. It also strengthens our crisis management capability. The Plan will contribute to ensuring that NATO remains a strong, ready, robust, and responsive Alliance capable of meeting current and future challenges from wherever they may arise.
  6. The elements of the Plan include measures that address both the continuing need for assurance of Allies and the adaptation of the Alliance’s military strategic posture.
  7. The assurance measures include continuous air, land, and maritime presence and meaningful military activity in the eastern part of the Alliance, both on a rotational basis. They will provide the fundamental baseline requirement for assurance and deterrence, and are flexible and scalable in response to the evolving security situation.
  8. Adaptation measures include the components required to ensure that the Alliance can fully address the security challenges it might face. We will significantly enhance the responsiveness of our NATO Response Force (NRF) by developing force packages that are able to move rapidly and respond to potential challenges and threats. As part of it, we will establish a Very High Readiness Joint Task Force (VJTF), a new Allied joint force that will be able to deploy within a few days to respond to challenges that arise, particularly at the periphery of NATO’s territory. This force should consist of a land component with appropriate air, maritime, and special operations forces available. Readiness of elements of the VJTF will be tested through short-notice exercises. We will also establish an appropriate command and control presence and some in-place force enablers on the territories of eastern Allies at all times, with contributions from Allies on a rotational basis, focusing on planning and exercising collective defence scenarios. If required, they will also facilitate reinforcement of Allies located at NATO’s periphery for deterrence and collective defence. We will further enhance NATO’s ability to quickly and effectively reinforce those Allies, including through preparation of infrastructure, prepositioning of equipment and supplies, and designation of specific bases. Adequate host nation support will be critical in this respect. We will also ensure that our Allied forces maintain the adequate readiness and coherence needed to conduct NATO’s full range of missions, including deterring aggression against NATO Allies and demonstrating preparedness to defend NATO territory. We will enhance our Standing Naval Forces to support maritime situational awareness and to conduct the full spectrum of conventional maritime operations.
  9. We will ensure that the current NATO Command Structure remains robust, agile, and able to undertake all elements of effective command and control for simultaneous challenges; this includes a regional focus to exploit regional expertise and enhance situational awareness. Contributing Allies will raise the readiness and capabilities of the Headquarters Multinational Corps Northeast and will also enhance its role as a hub for regional cooperation. We will enhance our intelligence and strategic awareness and we will place renewed emphasis on advance planning.
  10. We will establish an enhanced exercise programme with an increased focus on exercising collective defence including practising comprehensive responses to complex civil-military scenarios. The Connected Forces Initiative (CFI) we agreed in Chicago will be instrumental in ensuring full coherence of the training and exercise elements of the Readiness Action Plan.
  11. Development and implementation of the adaptation measures will be done on the basis of the evolving strategic environment in the regions of concern, including in the eastern and southern peripheries of the Alliance, which will be closely monitored, assessed, and prepared for.
  12. We have tasked our Defence Ministers to oversee the expeditious implementation of the Readiness Action Plan, which will begin immediately.
  13. We will ensure that NATO is able to effectively address the specific challenges posed by hybrid warfare threats, where a wide range of overt and covert military, paramilitary, and civilian measures are employed in a highly integrated design. It is essential that the Alliance possesses the necessary tools and procedures required to deter and respond effectively to hybrid warfare threats, and the capabilities to reinforce national forces. This will also include enhancing strategic communications, developing exercise scenarios in light of hybrid threats, and strengthening coordination between NATO and other organisations, in line with relevant decisions taken, with a view to improving information sharing, political consultations, and staff-to-staff coordination. We welcome the establishment of the NATO-accredited Strategic Communications Centre of Excellence in Latvia as a meaningful contribution to NATO’s efforts in this area. We have tasked the work on hybrid warfare to be reviewed alongside the implementation of the Readiness Action Plan.
  14. We agree to reverse the trend of declining defence budgets, to make the most effective use of our funds and to further a more balanced sharing of costs and responsibilities. Our overall security and defence depend both on how much we spend and how we spend it. Increased investments should be directed towards meeting our capability priorities, and Allies also need to display the political will to provide required capabilities and deploy forces when they are needed. A strong defence industry across the Alliance, including a stronger defence industry in Europe and greater defence industrial cooperation within Europe and across the Atlantic, remains essential for delivering the required capabilities. NATO and EU efforts to strengthen defence capabilities are complementary. Taking current commitments into account, we are guided by the following considerations:
    • Allies currently meeting the NATO guideline to spend a minimum of 2% of their Gross Domestic Product (GDP) on defence will aim to continue to do so. Likewise, Allies spending more than 20% of their defence budgets on major equipment, including related Research & Development, will continue to do so.
    • Allies whose current proportion of GDP spent on defence is below this level will:
      • halt any decline in defence expenditure;
      • aim to increase defence expenditure in real terms as GDP grows;
      • aim to move towards the 2% guideline within a decade with a view to meeting their NATO Capability Targets and filling NATO’s capability shortfalls.
    • Allies who currently spend less than 20% of their annual defence spending on major new equipment, including related Research & Development, will aim, within a decade, to increase their annual investments to 20% or more of total defence expenditures.
    • All Allies will:
      • ensure that their land, air and maritime forces meet NATO agreed guidelines for deployability and sustainability and other agreed output metrics;
      • ensure that their armed forces can operate together effectively, including through the implementation of agreed NATO standards and doctrines.
  1. Allies will review national progress annually. This will be discussed at future Defence Ministerial meetings and reviewed by Heads of State and Government at future Summits.
  2. We condemn in the strongest terms Russia’s escalating and illegal military intervention in Ukraine and demand that Russia stop and withdraw its forces from inside Ukraine and along the Ukrainian border. This violation of Ukraine’s sovereignty and territorial integrity is a serious breach of international law and a major challenge to Euro-Atlantic security. We do not and will not recognise Russia’s illegal and illegitimate ‘annexation’ of Crimea. We demand that Russia comply with international law and its international obligations and responsibilities; end its illegitimate occupation of Crimea; refrain from aggressive actions against Ukraine; withdraw its troops; halt the flow of weapons, equipment, people and money across the border to the separatists; and stop fomenting tension along and across the Ukrainian border. Russia must use its influence with the separatists to de-escalate the situation and take concrete steps to allow for a political and a diplomatic solution which respects Ukraine’s sovereignty, territorial integrity, and internationally recognised borders.
  3. We are deeply concerned that the violence and insecurity in the region caused by Russia and the Russian-backed separatists are resulting in a deteriorating humanitarian situation and material destruction in eastern Ukraine. We are concerned about discrimination against the native Crimean Tatars and other members of local communities in the Crimean peninsula. We demand that Russia take the necessary measures to ensure the safety, rights and freedoms of everyone living on the peninsula. This violence and insecurity also led to the tragic downing of Malaysia Airlines passenger flight MH17 on 17 July 2014. Recalling United Nations Security Council Resolution (UNSCR) 2166, Allies call upon all states and actors in the region to ensure immediate, safe, and unrestricted access to the crash site of MH17 to allow resumption of the investigation and the repatriation of the remains and belongings of the victims still present at the site. Those directly and indirectly responsible for the downing of MH17 should be held accountable and brought to justice as soon as possible.
  4. We are also concerned by Russia’s pattern of disregard for international law, including the UN Charter; its behaviour towards Georgia and the Republic of Moldova; its violation of fundamental European security arrangements and commitments, including those in the Helsinki Final Act; its long-standing non-implementation of the Conventional Armed Forces in Europe Treaty (CFE); and its use of military and other instruments to coerce neighbours. This threatens the rules-based international order and challenges Euro-Atlantic security. In addition, these developments may potentially have long-term effects on stability in the Black Sea region, which remains an important component of Euro-Atlantic security. Russia’s current actions are contrary to the principles on which the established confidence building mechanisms in the Black Sea were built. We will continue to support, as appropriate, regional efforts by Black Sea littoral states aimed at ensuring security and stability.
  5. While Russia continues to intervene militarily, arm separatists, and foment instability in Ukraine, we support the sanctions imposed by the European Union (EU), the G7, and others, which are an essential part of the overall international effort to address the destabilizing behaviour of Russia, bring it to de­escalate, and arrive at a political solution to the crisis created by its actions. Amongst these are measures taken by Allies including Canada, Norway and the United States, as well as the EU decisions to limit access to capital markets for Russian state-owned financial institutions, restrict trade in arms, establish restrictions for export of dual use goods for military end uses, curtail Russian access to sensitive defence and energy sector technologies, and other measures.
  6. Allies have had, and will continue in the course of our ongoing work, a strategic discussion regarding Euro-Atlantic security and Russia. This discussion provides the basis for NATO’s vision regarding our approach to, and the mechanisms of the Alliance’s relations with, Russia in the future.
  7. For more than two decades, NATO has strived to build a partnership with Russia, including through the mechanism of the NATO-Russia Council, based upon the NATO-Russia Founding Act and the Rome Declaration. Russia has breached its commitments, as well as violated international law, thus breaking the trust at the core of our cooperation. The decisions we have taken at the Summit demonstrate our respect for the rules-based European security architecture.
  8. We continue to believe that a partnership between NATO and Russia based on respect for international law would be of strategic value. We continue to aspire to a cooperative, constructive relationship with Russia, including reciprocal confidence building and transparency measures and increased mutual understanding of NATO’s and Russia’s non-strategic nuclear force postures in Europe, based on our common security concerns and interests, in a Europe where each country freely chooses its future. We regret that the conditions for that relationship do not currently exist. As a result, NATO’s decision to suspend all practical civilian and military cooperation between NATO and Russia remains in place. Political channels of communication, however, remain open.
  9. The Alliance does not seek confrontation and poses no threat to Russia. But we cannot and will not compromise on the principles on which our Alliance and security in Europe and North America rest. NATO is both transparent and predictable, and we are resolved to display endurance and resilience, as we have done since the founding of our Alliance. The nature of the Alliance’s relations with Russia and our aspiration for partnership will be contingent on our seeing a clear, constructive change in Russia’s actions which demonstrates compliance with international law and its international obligations and responsibilities.
  10. An independent, sovereign, and stable Ukraine, firmly committed to democracy and the rule of law, is key to Euro-Atlantic security. At a time when Ukraine’s security is being undermined, the Alliance continues its full support for Ukraine’s sovereignty, independence and territorial integrity within its internationally recognised borders. The broad support for United Nations General Assembly Resolution 68/262 on the Territorial Integrity of Ukraine, demonstrates the international rejection of Russia’s illegal and illegitimate ‘annexation’ of Crimea. We are extremely concerned by the further escalation of aggressive actions in eastern Ukraine. We see a concerted campaign of violence by Russia and Russian-backed separatists aimed at destabilising Ukraine as a sovereign state.
  11. We commend the people of Ukraine for their commitment to freedom and democracy and their determination to decide their own future and foreign policy course free from outside interference. We welcome the holding of free and fair Presidential elections on 25 May 2014 under difficult conditions and the signature of the Association Agreement with the European Union on 27 June 2014, which testify to the consolidation of Ukraine’s democracy and its European aspiration. In this context, we look forward to the elections to the Verkhovna Rada in October 2014.
  12. We encourage Ukraine to further promote an inclusive political process, based on democratic values and respect for human rights, minorities, and the rule of law. We welcome President Poroshenko’s Peace Plan and call on all parties to meet their commitments, including those made in Geneva and Berlin. We call on Russia to engage in a constructive dialogue with the Ukrainian government. We actively support ongoing diplomatic efforts towards a sustainable political solution to the conflict which respects Ukraine’s sovereignty, independence, and territorial integrity within its internationally recognised borders.
  13. We commend and fully support the actions of other international organisations that are contributing to de-escalation and pursuing a peaceful solution to the crisis, in particular the Organisation for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) and the EU. We welcome the swift deployment of the OSCE Special Monitoring Mission, which must be able to operate unhindered and have access to all regions of Ukraine in order to fulfil its mandate. We also welcome the decision by the EU to launch a Common Security and Defence Policy mission to assist Ukraine in the field of civilian security sector reform, including police and the rule of law.
  14. Recognising the right of Ukraine to restore peace and order and to defend its people and territory, we encourage the Ukrainian armed forces and security services to continue to exercise the utmost restraint in their ongoing operation so as to avoid casualties among the local civilian population.
  15. Ukraine is a long-standing and distinctive partner of the Alliance. At our meeting here in Wales, we met with President Poroshenko and issued a joint statement. We highly value Ukraine’s past and present contributions to all current Allied operations as well as to the NATO Response Force. We encourage and will continue to support Ukraine’s implementation of wide-ranging reforms through the Annual National Programme, in the framework of our Distinctive Partnership. We have launched additional efforts to support the reform and transformation of the security and defence sectors and promote greater interoperability between Ukraine’s and NATO forces. These efforts are designed to enhance Ukraine’s ability to provide for its own security. We welcome Ukraine’s participation in the Partnership Interoperability Initiative and Ukraine’s interest in the enhanced opportunities within the Initiative, and look forward to its future participation.
  16. Russia’s illegitimate occupation of Crimea and military intervention in eastern Ukraine have raised legitimate concerns among several of NATO’s other partners in Eastern Europe. Allies will continue to support the right of partners to make independent and sovereign choices on foreign and security policy, free from external pressure and coercion. Allies also remain committed in their support to the territorial integrity, independence, and sovereignty of Armenia, Azerbaijan, Georgia and the Republic of Moldova.
  17. In this context, we will continue to support efforts towards a peaceful settlement of the conflicts in the south Caucasus, as well as in the Republic of Moldova, based upon these principles and the norms of international law, the UN Charter, and the Helsinki Final Act. The persistence of these protracted conflicts continues to be a matter of particular concern, undermining the opportunities for citizens in the region to reach their full potential as members of the Euro-Atlantic community. We urge all parties to engage constructively and with reinforced political will in peaceful conflict resolution, within the established negotiation frameworks.
  18. We are deeply concerned by the growing instability and mounting transnational and multi-dimensional threats across the Middle East and North Africa region. These threats directly affect the security of the people living there, as well as our own security. Peace and stability in this region are essential for the Alliance. Therefore, we emphasise the need for lasting calm and an end to violence. We continue to support the legitimate aspirations of the peoples in this region for peace, security, democracy, justice, prosperity, and the preservation of their identity. We will continue to closely monitor the situation and explore options for possible NATO assistance to bilateral and international efforts to promote stability and contribute to the response to the growing crisis in, and threats from, the Middle East region.
  19. The so-called Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) poses a grave threat to the Iraqi people, to the Syrian people, to the wider region, and to our nations. We are outraged by ISIL’s recent barbaric attacks against all civilian populations, in particular the systematic and deliberate targeting of entire religious and ethnic communities. We condemn in the strongest terms ISIL’s violent and cowardly acts. If the security of any Ally is threatened, we will not hesitate to take all necessary steps to ensure our collective defence. The rapid deterioration of the security situation in Iraq and ISIL’s expanding threat underline the necessity for a political solution based upon an inclusive Iraqi government with cross-sectarian representation. Additionally, in light of the dramatic humanitarian consequences of this crisis and its repercussions on regional stability and security, many Allies have already provided, and are offering, security and humanitarian assistance to Iraq on a bilateral basis.
  20. We re-affirm NATO’s continued commitment to the NATO-Iraq partnership, through which we will revitalise our effort to help Iraq build more effective security forces. That partnership encompasses, within the existing Individual Partnership and Cooperation Programme, cooperation in the areas of: political dialogue; education and training; response to terrorism; defence institution building; border security; and communications strategy. Allies and partners should continue to help coordinate humanitarian assistance to Iraq through the appropriate channels. We welcome the role that the Euro-Atlantic Disaster Response Coordination Centre is playing. We have also agreed that NATO will help coordinate among Allies and partners security assistance support to Iraq; this could also include helping coordinate the provision of lift to deliver assistance. Should the Iraqi government request it, NATO will stand ready to consider measures in the framework of NATO’s Defence and Related Security Capacity Building Initiative with an eye to launching such an effort in the near term. NATO will support ongoing bilateral efforts of Allies and partners by soliciting and coordinating, on a voluntary basis, Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance assets. Additionally, Allies will seek to enhance their cooperation in exchanging information on returning foreign fighters.
  21. We continue to follow the ongoing crisis in Syria with grave concern. We condemn in the strongest terms the campaign of violence against the Syrian people by the Assad regime, which caused the current chaos and devastation in this country. We call on the Syrian government to fully comply with the provisions of all relevant UNSCRs and to immediately commit to a genuine political transition in accordance with the 30 June 2012 Geneva Communiqué. We believe a negotiated political transition is essential to bring an end to the bloodshed. We highlight the important role of the moderate opposition to protect communities against the dual threats of the Syrian regime’s tyranny and ISIL’s extremism. More than three years of fighting have had dramatic humanitarian consequences and a growing impact on the security of regional countries. Despite possible destabilising effects on their economies and societies, NATO member Turkey, our regional partner Jordan, as well as neighbouring Lebanon, are generously hosting millions of refugees and displaced Syrians. The deployment of Patriot missiles to defend the population and territory of Turkey is a strong demonstration of NATO’s resolve and ability to defend and deter any potential threat against any Ally.
  22. We welcome the successful completion by the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW)-United Nations Joint Mission and Allies of the removal and elimination of Syria’s declared chemical weapons, as called for in UNSCR 2118 and OPCW Executive Council decisions. NATO Allies played a key role in ensuring this success as well as in the destruction of the chemical materials themselves. We remain highly concerned by continuing reports of the use of chemicals as weapons in Syria. Twelve chemical weapon production facilities are still awaiting destruction and questions remain concerning the completeness and accuracy of Syria’s chemical weapons declaration. We urge the Assad government to answer all outstanding questions regarding its declaration to the OPCW, to address all remaining issues, and to take action to ensure full compliance with its obligations under the Chemical Weapons Convention, UNSCR 2118, and OPCW Executive Council decisions.
  23. ISIL has, with its recent advance into Iraq, become a transnational threat. The Assad regime has contributed to the emergence of ISIL in Syria and its expansion beyond. ISIL’s presence in both Syria and Iraq is a threat to regional stability. It has become a key obstacle to political settlement in Syria and a serious risk to the stability and territorial integrity of Iraq. The people of Syria and Iraq and elsewhere in the region need the support of the international community to counter this threat. A coordinated international approach is required.
  24. We are deeply concerned by the ongoing violence and the deteriorating security situation in Libya, which threaten to undermine the goals for which the Libyan people have suffered so much and which pose a threat to the wider region. We urge all parties to cease all violence and engage without delay in constructive efforts aimed at fostering an inclusive political dialogue in the interest of the entire Libyan people, as part of the democratic process. Recognising the central role of the UN in coordinating international efforts in Libya, we strongly support the ongoing efforts of the United Nations Support Mission in Libya (UNSMIL) to achieve an immediate ceasefire, scale down tensions, and contribute to national reconciliation. Our Operation Unified Protector demonstrated NATO’s determination, together with regional Arab partners, to protect the Libyan people. On the basis of NATO’s decision in October 2013, following a request by the Libyan authorities, we continue to stand ready to support Libya with advice on defence and security institution building and to develop a long-term partnership, possibly leading to Libya’s membership in the Mediterranean Dialogue, which would be a natural framework for our cooperation.
  25. While Mali has re-established a constitutional order, we recognise that terrorist acts and the trafficking of arms, drugs, and people across the Sahel-Sahara region threaten regional and our own security. We welcome the efforts of the UN and underscore the importance of a strong commitment by the international community to address the complex security and political challenges in this region. In this respect, we welcome the comprehensive Sahel strategies of the African Union and the EU. We also welcome the robust and credible military commitment of Allies in the Sahel-Sahara region, which contributes to the reaffirmation of the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the African countries concerned, and to the security of the Alliance. NATO is prepared to explore, upon request by the countries concerned, where it can contribute to address these challenges, in full coordination with UN, EU, regional and bilateral efforts.
  26. In the strategically important Western Balkans region, democratic values, the rule of law, and good neighbourly relations continue to play a pivotal role in maintaining lasting peace and stability. The Alliance remains fully committed to the stability and security of the region, and we will continue to actively support the Euro-Atlantic aspirations of countries in this region. Allies and their Western Balkans partners actively contribute to the maintenance of regional and international peace, including through regional cooperation formats.
  27. We welcome Serbia’s progress in building a stronger partnership with NATO and encourage Belgrade to continue on this path. We also welcome the progress achieved in Kosovo and encourage further efforts to strengthen democratic institutions and the rule of law throughout a multi-ethnic Kosovo. The 8 June 2014 parliamentary elections were largely in line with international standards and an important milestone. We look forward to the expeditious formation of a representative and inclusive government, committed to the EU-facilitated Belgrade-Pristina dialogue. We welcome the improvement of the security situation and the progress achieved through the dialogue. We commend both parties for their commitment to the Belgrade-Pristina agreement of 19 April 2013 and encourage continued work on its full implementation.
  28. We met yesterday in an expanded meeting on Afghanistan and, together with our International Security and Assistance Force (ISAF) partners, we issued a Wales Summit Declaration on Afghanistan.
  29. For over a decade, NATO Allies and partner nations from across the world have stood shoulder to shoulder with Afghanistan in the largest operation in the history of the Alliance. This unprecedented effort has enhanced global security and contributed to a better future for Afghan men, women, and children. We honour the Afghan and international personnel who have lost their lives or been injured in this endeavour.
  30. With the end of ISAF in December 2014, the nature and scope of our engagement with Afghanistan will change. We envisage three parallel, mutually reinforcing strands of activity: in the short term, NATO Allies and partner nations stand ready to continue to train, advise, and assist the Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF) after 2014 through the non-combat Resolute Support Mission; in the medium term, we reaffirm our commitment to contribute to the financial sustainment of the ANSF; in the long term, we remain committed to strengthening NATO’s partnership with Afghanistan. We count on Afghanistan’s commitment and cooperation.
  31. We recognise the particular importance of advancing regional cooperation and good neighbourly relations for the security and stability of Afghanistan. We remain determined to support the Afghan people in their efforts to build a stable, sovereign, democratic, and united country, where rule of law and good governance prevail, and in which human rights for all, especially the rights of women, including their full participation in decision making, and those of children, are fully protected. Working with the Government of Afghanistan and the wider international community, our goal remains to never again be threatened by terrorists from within Afghanistan. Our commitment to Afghanistan will endure.
  32. We commend the Kosovo Force (KFOR) for the successful conduct of its mission over the past 15 years, in accordance with UNSCR 1244. KFOR will continue to contribute to a safe and secure environment and freedom of movement in Kosovo in close cooperation with the Kosovo authorities and the EU, as agreed. KFOR will also continue to support the development of a peaceful, stable and multi-ethnic Kosovo. The Alliance will continue to assist the Kosovo Security Force with advice on the ground and will keep the nature of further support under review.
  33. We will continue to maintain KFOR’s robust and credible capability to carry out its mission. Sustained improvement in the security situation and the successful implementation of agreements reached in the EU-facilitated dialogue between Belgrade and Pristina will allow NATO to consider a possible change in its force posture. Any reduction of our troop presence will be measured against clear benchmarks and indicators, and will remain conditions-based and not calendar-driven.
  34. Operation Active Endeavour in the Mediterranean will continue to adapt to meet evolving security risks in an area of essential strategic interest to the Alliance. Somalia-based piracy has not been eradicated. NATO has contributed to a steady reduction in pirate activity off the coast of Somalia through Operation Ocean Shield, working in coordination with the relevant international actors, including the EU and other nations, in line with the relevant decisions taken. We have agreed to continue NATO’s counter piracy involvement off the coast of Somalia until the end of 2016, utilising a focused presence to optimise the use of NATO assets. Both of these operations contribute to enhancing the Alliance’s maritime situational awareness, interoperability, and engagement with partners.
  35. The greatest responsibility of the Alliance is to protect and defend our territory and our populations against attack, as set out in Article 5 of the Washington Treaty. No one should doubt NATO’s resolve if the security of any of its members were to be threatened. NATO will maintain the full range of capabilities necessary to deter and defend against any threat to the safety and security of our populations, wherever it should arise.
  36. Deterrence, based on an appropriate mix of nuclear, conventional, and missile defence capabilities, remains a core element of our overall strategy.
  37. As long as nuclear weapons exist, NATO will remain a nuclear alliance. The strategic nuclear forces of the Alliance, particularly those of the United States, are the supreme guarantee of the security of the Allies. The independent strategic nuclear forces of the United Kingdom and France have a deterrent role of their own and contribute to the overall deterrence and security of the Alliance. The circumstances in which any use of nuclear weapons might have to be contemplated are extremely remote.
  38. The Allies’ conventional forces make essential contributions to the deterrence of a broad range of threats. They contribute to providing visible assurance of NATO’s cohesion as well as the Alliance’s ability and commitment to respond to the security concerns of each and every Ally.
  39. Missile defence can complement the role of nuclear weapons in deterrence; it cannot substitute for them. The capability is purely defensive.
  40. Arms control,disarmament, and non-proliferation continue to play an important role in the achievement of the Alliance’s security objectives. Both the success and failure of these efforts can have a direct impact on the threat environment of NATO. In this context, it is of paramount importance that disarmament and non-proliferation commitments under existing treaties are honoured, including the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty, which is a crucial element of Euro-Atlantic security. In that regard, Allies call on Russia to preserve the viability of the INF Treaty through ensuring full and verifiable compliance.
  41. The threat to NATO populations, territory, and forces posed by the proliferation of ballistic missiles continues to increase and missile defence forms part of a broader response to counter it. At our Summit in Lisbon in 2010 we decided to develop a NATO Ballistic Missile Defence (BMD) capability to pursue our core task of collective defence. Missile defence will become an integral part of the Alliance’s overall defence posture and contribute to the indivisible security of the Alliance.
  42. The aim of this capability is to provide full coverage and protection for all NATO European populations, territory, and forces against the increasing threats posed by the proliferation of ballistic missiles, based on the principles of indivisibility of Allies’ security and NATO solidarity, equitable sharing of risks and burdens, as well as reasonable challenge, taking into account the level of threat, affordability, and technical feasibility, and in accordance with the latest common threat assessments agreed by the Alliance. Should international efforts reduce the threats posed by ballistic missile proliferation, NATO missile defence can and will adapt accordingly.
  43. At our Summit in Chicago in 2012, we declared the achievement of an Interim NATO BMD Capability as an operationally significant first step, offering maximum coverage, within available means, to defend our populations, territory, and forces across southern NATO Europe against a ballistic missile attack. NATO Interim BMD is operationally capable.
  44. Today we are pleased to note that the deployment of Aegis Ashore in Deveselu, Romania is on track to be completed in the 2015 timeframe. Aegis Ashore will be offered to NATO and will provide a significant increase in NATO BMD capability. We are also pleased to note the forward deployment of BMD-capable Aegis ships to Rota, Spain. Building on the Interim Capability, the additional Aegis BMD-capable ships could be made available to NATO.
  45. Today we are also pleased to note that additional voluntary national contributions have been offered, and that several Allies are developing, including through multinational cooperation, or are acquiring further BMD capabilities that could become available to the Alliance. Our aim remains to provide the Alliance with a NATO operational BMD that can provide full coverage and protection for all NATO European populations, territory, and forces, based on voluntary national contributions, including nationally funded interceptors and sensors, hosting arrangements, and on the expansion of the Active Layered Theatre Ballistic Missile Defence (ALTBMD) capability. Only the command and control systems of ALTBMD and their expansion to territorial defence are eligible for common funding.
  46. We note the potential opportunities for cooperation on missile defence, and encourage Allies to explore possible additional voluntary national contributions, including through multinational cooperation, to provide relevant capabilities, as well as to use potential synergies in planning, development, procurement, and deployment. We also note that BMD features in two Smart Defence projects.
  47. As with all of NATO’s operations, full political control by Allies over military actions undertaken pursuant to this capability will be ensured. To this end, we will continue to deepen political oversight of NATO BMD as the capability develops. We welcome the completion of the Alliance’s review of the arrangements for NATO Interim BMD Capability and note that the Alliance will be ready to make use of additional Allied contributions as they are made available to the Alliance. We also task the Council to regularly review the implementation of the NATO BMD capability, including before the Foreign and Defence Ministers’ meetings, and prepare a comprehensive report on progress and issues to be addressed for its future development by our next Summit.
  48. We remain prepared to engage with third states, on a case-by-case basis, to enhance transparency and confidence and to increase ballistic missile defence effectiveness. Initial steps have been made and could lead to various forms of engagement with third states on missile defence. As we did in Chicago in 2012, we reaffirm that NATO missile defence is not directed against Russia and will not undermine Russia’s strategic deterrence capabilities. NATO missile defence is intended to defend against potential threats emanating from outside the Euro-Atlantic area.
  49. The Alliance reaffirms its long-standing commitment to conventional arms control as a key element of Euro-Atlantic security and emphasises the importance of full implementation and compliance to rebuild trust and confidence. Russia’s unilateral military activity in and around Ukraine has undermined peace, security, and stability across the region, and its selective implementation of the Vienna Document and Open Skies Treaty and long-standing non-implementation of the Conventional Armed Forces in Europe Treaty (CFE) have eroded the positive contributions of these arms control instruments. Allies call on Russia to fully adhere to its commitments. Allies are determined to preserve, strengthen, and modernise conventional arms control in Europe, based on key principles and commitments, including reciprocity, transparency, and host nation consent.
  50. At our last Summit in Chicago we set ourselves the ambitious goal of NATO Forces 2020: modern, tightly connected forces equipped, trained, exercised, and commanded so as to be able to meet NATO’s Level of Ambition and so that they can operate together and with partners in any environment. We judge that the goal remains valid and reaffirm our commitment to delivering it. The Readiness Action Plan complements and reinforces NATO Forces 2020 by improving our overall readiness and responsiveness.
  51. NATO needs, now more than ever, modern, robust, and capable forces at high readiness, in the air, on land and at sea, in order to meet current and future challenges. We are committed to further enhancing our capabilities. To this end, today we have agreed a Defence Planning Package with a number of priorities, such as enhancing and reinforcing training and exercises; command and control, including for demanding air operations; intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance; NATO’s ballistic missile defence capability, in accordance with the decisions taken at the 2010 Lisbon and 2012 Chicago Summits, including the voluntary nature of national contributions; cyber defence; as well as improving the robustness and readiness of our land forces for both collective defence and crisis response. Fulfilment of these priorities will increase the Alliance’s collective capabilities and better prepare NATO to address current and future threats and challenges. We have agreed this Package in order to inform our defence investments and to improve the capabilities that Allies have in national inventories. In this context, NATO joint air power capabilities require longer-term consideration.
  52. We continue to emphasise multinational cooperation. Following the Joint Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance (JISR) initiative launched at our Chicago Summit, work is on track to deliver an initial operational capability to support NATO operations and NATO Response Force rotations from 2016 onwards. In this context, we note the progress in the development of the Alliance Ground Surveillance capability that will become available for operational deployment in 2017. Furthermore, NATO’s Airborne Early Warning and Control Force will continue to be modernised to maintain its full operational capability. JISR exemplifies the advantages of multinational cooperation in capability development and employment among Allies, which allow for significant operational and cost benefits. In this spirit, several Allies are establishing a multinational MQ-9 remotely-piloted air system users group, in particular to enhance interoperability and reduce overall costs.
  53. In a similar vein, we highlight the fact that, since we launched the Smart Defence initiative at our Chicago Summit, an ever growing number of multinational projects have been set up to help Allies harmonise requirements, pool resources, and achieve tangible benefits in terms of operational effectiveness as well as cost efficiency. We are building on this positive momentum, in particular to address Alliance priority capability requirements. Specifically, two groups of Allies have agreed to work on, respectively, increasing the availability of air-to-ground Precision Guided Munitions, and on the provision of a deployable airbase capability, and have signed Letters of Intent to this effect. A further two groups of Allies have decided to establish concrete projects for improving JISR information exchange in operations and ballistic missile defence, including naval training.
  54. Today we have also endorsed the NATO Framework Nations Concept. It focuses on groups of Allies coming together to work multinationally for the joint development of forces and capabilities required by the Alliance, facilitated by a framework nation. Its implementation will contribute to providing the Alliance with coherent sets of forces and capabilities, particularly in Europe. It will help demonstrate European Allies’ willingness to do more for our common security and also improve the balance of the provision of capabilities between the United States and European Allies as well as among European Allies themselves. To implement this concept, today, a group of ten Allies, facilitated by Germany as a framework nation and focusing on capability development, have, through a joint letter, committed to working systematically together, deepening and intensifying their cooperation in the long term, to create, in various configurations, a number of multinational projects to address Alliance priority areas across a broad spectrum of capabilities. They will initially concentrate on creating coherent sets of capabilities in the areas of logistics support; chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear protection; delivering fire-power from land, air, and sea; and deployable headquarters. Another group of seven Allies, facilitated by the United Kingdom as a framework nation, have also agreed today to establish the Joint Expeditionary Force (JEF), a rapidly deployable force capable of conducting the full spectrum of operations, including high intensity operations. The JEF will facilitate the efficient deployment of existing and emerging military capabilities and units. Additionally, a group of six Allies, facilitated by Italy as a framework nation and based on regional ties, will focus on improving a number of Alliance capability areas, such as stabilisation and reconstruction, provision of enablers, usability of land formations, and command and control. Other groupings are being developed in line with the Framework Nations Concept.
  55. Two Allies have announced their intention to establish a Combined Joint Expeditionary Force, to be delivered from 2016 and to be available for the full spectrum of operations, including at high intensity.
  56. We continue to build on the experience gained in recent operations and improve our interoperability through the Connected Forces Initiative (CFI). Today we have endorsed a substantial CFI Package consisting of six key deliverables, including the high-visibility exercise Trident Juncture 2015, with 25,000 personnel to be hosted by Spain, Portugal, and Italy; a broader and more demanding exercise programme from 2016 onwards; and a deployable Special Operations Component Command headquarters. As a key component in delivering NATO Forces 2020, the CFI addresses the full range of missions, including the most demanding, thereby demonstrating the continued cohesion and resolve of the Alliance. It provides the structure for Allies to train and exercise coherently; reinforces full-spectrum joint and combined training; promotes interoperability, including with partners; and leverages advances in technology, such as the Federated Mission Networking framework, which will enhance information sharing in the Alliance and with partners in support of training, exercises and operations.
  57. In this context, NATO will continue to work closely with the EU, as agreed, to ensure that our Smart Defence and the EU’s Pooling and Sharing initiatives are complementary and mutually reinforcing, and to support capability development and interoperability with a view to avoiding unnecessary duplication and maximising cost- effectiveness. We welcome the efforts of NATO nations and EU member states, in particular in the areas of strategic airlift and air-to-air refuelling, medical support, maritime surveillance, satellite communication, and training, as well as efforts of several nations in the area of remotely piloted aircraft systems. We also welcome the national efforts in these and other areas by European Allies and partners, which will benefit both organisations. The success of our efforts will continue to depend on mutual transparency and openness between the two organisations. We encourage making the fullest use of existing NATO-EU mechanisms to this effect.
  58. The geopolitical and economic importance of the maritime domain in the 21st century continues to grow. NATO needs to adapt to a complex, more crowded, rapidly evolving, and increasingly unpredictable maritime security environment. This necessitates a strengthening of the Alliance’s maritime capabilities, which should not be seen in isolation but as an integral part of NATO’s larger toolbox to safeguard the Alliance’s interests. We will therefore continue to intensify and expand our implementation of the Alliance Maritime Strategy, further enhancing the Alliance’s effectiveness in the maritime domain and its contributions to deterrence and collective defence, crisis management, cooperative security, and maritime security. We will reinvigorate NATO’s Standing Naval Forces by making their composition and the duration of national contributions more flexible and, in principle, no longer using them for protracted operations or for operations with low-end tasks. In addition, we will enhance their education, training, and exercise value, especially at the high end of the spectrum. We will also investigate ways to enhance further the effectiveness of the full range of Alliance maritime capabilities. Greater co-ordination, cooperation, and complementarity with relevant international organisations, including the EU, in line with the relevant decisions taken, as well as work with partner and non-partner nations, will be an important element of the implementation of the Alliance Maritime Strategy. We welcome the adoption of the EU’s Maritime Security Strategy in June 2014, which will potentially contribute to the security of all Allies.
  59. As the Alliance looks to the future, cyber threats and attacks will continue to become more common, sophisticated, and potentially damaging. To face this evolving challenge, we have endorsed an Enhanced Cyber Defence Policy, contributing to the fulfillment of the Alliance’s core tasks. The policy reaffirms the principles of the indivisibility of Allied security and of prevention, detection, resilience, recovery, and defence. It recalls that the fundamental cyber defence responsibility of NATO is to defend its own networks, and that assistance to Allies should be addressed in accordance with the spirit of solidarity, emphasizing the responsibility of Allies to develop the relevant capabilities for the protection of national networks. Our policy also recognises that international law, including international humanitarian law and the UN Charter, applies in cyberspace. Cyber attacks can reach a threshold that threatens national and Euro-Atlantic prosperity, security, and stability. Their impact could be as harmful to modern societies as a conventional attack. We affirm therefore that cyber defence is part of NATO’s core task of collective defence. A decision as to when a cyber attack would lead to the invocation of Article 5 would be taken by the North Atlantic Council on a case-by-case basis.
  60. We are committed to developing further our national cyber defence capabilities, and we will enhance the cyber security of national networks upon which NATO depends for its core tasks, in order to help make the Alliance resilient and fully protected. Close bilateral and multinational cooperation plays a key role in enhancing the cyber defence capabilities of the Alliance. We will continue to integrate cyber defence into NATO operations and operational and contingency planning, and enhance information sharing and situational awareness among Allies. Strong partnerships play a key role in addressing cyber threats and risks. We will therefore continue to engage actively on cyber issues with relevant partner nations on a case-by-case basis and with other international organisations, including the EU, as agreed, and will intensify our cooperation with industry through a NATO Industry Cyber Partnership. Technological innovations and expertise from the private sector are crucial to enable NATO and Allies to achieve the Enhanced Cyber Defence Policy’s objectives. We will improve the level of NATO’s cyber defence education, training, and exercise activities. We will develop the NATO cyber range capability, building, as a first step, on the Estonian cyber range capability, while taking into consideration the capabilities and requirements of the NATO CIS School and other NATO training and education bodies.
  61. NATO recognises the importance of inclusive, sustainable, innovative, and globally competitive defence industries, which include small and medium-sized enterprises, to develop and sustain national defence capabilities and the defence technological and industrial base in the whole of Europe and in North America.
  62. The proliferation of nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction (WMD), as well as their means of delivery, by states and non-state actors continues to present a threat to our populations, territory, and forces. The Alliance is resolved to seek a safer world for all and to create the conditions for a world without nuclear weapons in accordance with the goals of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) in a way that promotes international stability and is based on the principle of undiminished security for all. Addressing serious proliferation challenges remains an urgent international priority.
  63. We call on Iran to seize the opportunity of the extension of the Joint Plan of Action until 24 November 2014 to make the strategic choices that will restore confidence in the exclusively peaceful nature of Iran’s nuclear programme. We continue to call on Iran to comply fully with all its international obligations, including all relevant Resolutions of the United Nations Security Council and the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) Board of Governors. We also underscore the importance of Iran’s cooperation with the IAEA to resolve all outstanding issues, in particular those related to possible military dimensions of its nuclear programme.
  64. We are deeply concerned by the nuclear and ballistic missiles programmes and proliferation activities of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK) and call on it to comply fully with all relevant UNSCRs and the 2005 Joint Statement of the Six-Party Talks. We call on the DPRK to abandon all its existing nuclear and ballistic missile programmes in a complete, verifiable, and irreversible manner and immediately cease all related activities. We strongly condemn the DPRK’s December 2012 launch, which used ballistic missile technology, the nuclear test carried out by the DPRK in February 2013, and the various launches of short- and medium-range ballistic missiles since February 2014. We call on the DPRK to refrain from any further nuclear tests, launches using ballistic missile technology, or other provocations.
  65. The upcoming 2015 NPT Review Conference is an opportunity for parties to reaffirm support for this Treaty and for its non-proliferation, disarmament and peaceful uses pillars. Allies support efforts towards the success of this conference. We call for universal adherence to, and compliance with, the NPT and the Additional Protocol to the IAEA Safeguards Agreement and call for full implementation of UNSCR 1540 and welcome further work under UNSCR 1977. We call on all states to commit to combating effectively the proliferation of WMD through the universalisation of the Chemical Weapons Convention, the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention, the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty and through the Proliferation Security Initiative. We also call on all States to continue strengthening the security of nuclear materials and of radioactive sources within their borders, as they were called on to do by the Nuclear Security Summits of 2010 (Washington), 2012 (Seoul), and 2014 (The Hague). We will also ensure that NATO is postured to counter Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear (CBRN) threats, including through the Combined Joint CBRN Defence Task Force.
  66. Terrorism poses a direct threat to the security of the citizens of NATO countries and to international stability and prosperity more broadly, and will remain a threat for the foreseeable future. It is a global threat that knows no border, nationality, or religion – a challenge that the international community must fight and tackle together. We reaffirm our commitment to fight terrorism with unwavering resolve in accordance with international law and the principles of the UN Charter. NATO Allies are exposed to a wide range of terrorist threats. NATO has a role to play, including through our military cooperation with partners to build their capacity to face such threats, and through enhanced information sharing. Without prejudice to national legislation or responsibilities, the Alliance strives at all times to remain aware of the evolving threat from terrorism; to ensure that it has adequate capabilities to prevent, protect against, and respond to terrorist threats; and to engage with partners and other international organisations, as appropriate, promoting common understanding and practical cooperation in support of the UN Global Counter-Terrorism Strategy, including in areas such as Explosive Risk Management. Building on our Defence Against Terrorism Programme of Work, we will continue to improve our capabilities and technologies, including to defend against Improvised Explosive Devices and CBRN threats. We will keep terrorism and related threats high on NATO’s security agenda.
  67. NATO Allies form a unique community of values, committed to the principles of individual liberty, democracy, human rights, and the rule of law. The Alliance is convinced that these shared values and our security are strengthened when we work with our wide network of partners around the globe. We will continue to engage actively to enhance international security through partnership with relevant countries and other international organisations, in accordance with our Berlin Partnership Policy.
  68. Partnerships are, and will continue to be, essential to the way NATO works. Partners have served with us in Afghanistan, Kosovo, and other operations, sacrificing alongside Alliance troops, and work with us in combating terrorism and piracy. Partners make significant contributions to our practical cooperation activities in a number of different areas, including Trust Funds. Together with our partners, we have built a broad cooperative security network. Allies are resolved to maintain and build on this legacy, as our partnerships play a crucial role in the promotion of international peace and security. At this Summit, we therefore collectively pledge to strengthen the political dialogue and practical cooperation with our partners who share our vision for cooperative security in an international order based on the rule of law. We will continue to build defence capacity and interoperability through such initiatives as the Defence Education Enhancement Programme and the Professional Development Programme. We will also continue to promote transparency, accountability, and integrity in the defence sectors of interested nations through the Building Integrity programme.
  69. This year we celebrate twenty years of the Partnership for Peace (PfP). PfP and the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council are, and will continue to be, a part of our vision of a Europe whole, free, and at peace. They have forged political ties across Europe, through the Caucasus and into Central Asia; they have also been the foundation for practical cooperation to address common threats to our shared security, including in the field of human security. This cooperation was driven, at heart, by the common values and principles to which Allies and partners have all committed in the PfP founding documents. They include the promise to refrain from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state, to respect internationally recognised borders, and to settle disputes by peaceful means. These principles are as important as ever today and must be upheld unequivocally across the Euro-Atlantic community.
  70. We reaffirm our commitment to the Mediterranean Dialogue (MD) and Istanbul Cooperation Initiative (ICI) and the principles that underpin them; MD and ICI remain two complementary yet distinct partnership frameworks. We look forward to deepening our political dialogue and practical cooperation in both fora, building on many years of steady progress. We remain open to welcoming new members from the Mediterranean and the broader Middle East region to these frameworks.
  71. This year we also celebrate twenty years of the Mediterranean Dialogue. Today, as the Mediterranean region faces huge security challenges with wide-ranging implications for Euro-Atlantic security, the importance of this forum, which brings together key countries from NATO’s southern border, is clearer than ever. Enhancing the political dimension of MD will help to address the challenges of the region. We stand ready to continue working with our MD partners to make the most of the opportunities offered by their partnership with NATO, including individual partnership and cooperation programmes.
  72. We also celebrate ten years of the Istanbul Cooperation Initiative, which has helped to promote understanding and security cooperation with our partners in the Gulf region. We encourage our ICI partner countries to be proactive in taking full advantage of the opportunities offered by their partnership with NATO, including individual partnership and cooperation programmes.
  73. We will also intensify efforts to engage with and reach out to those partners across the globe that can contribute significantly to addressing shared security concerns. The Berlin Partnership Policy has created increased opportunities for these countries to work individually with NATO at the political and practical level. We welcome that some of our partners across the globe have seized these opportunities by providing support to operations and engaging in security cooperation and dialogue to enhance common understanding of our shared security interests.
  74. We will likewise look to further develop relations with relevant regional international organisations, such as the Gulf Cooperation Council and the Arab League, and be open to engaging with others, including in the context of regional crisis situations.
  75. As combat operations end in Afghanistan, we will ensure that the bonds forged between Allied and partner nations’ armed forces remain as strong as ever. We have fought together. Now we will focus on preparing and training together. We have therefore adopted a comprehensive Partnership Interoperability Initiative to enhance our ability to tackle security challenges together with our partners. Here in Wales, our Defence Ministers launched the Interoperability Platform, meeting with 24 partners1 that have demonstrated their commitment to reinforce their interoperability with NATO. These partners have been invited to work with us to take forward dialogue and practical cooperation on interoperability issues. Defence Ministers also met with five partners 2 that make particularly significant contributions to NATO operations to discuss further deepening dialogue and practical cooperation as part of the enhanced opportunities within the Partnership Interoperability Initiative. We stand ready to consider the addition of other partners as their contributions and interests warrant.
  76. Today we have decided to launch a Defence and Related Security Capacity Building Initiative to reinforce our commitment to partner nations and to help the Alliance to project stability without deploying large combat forces, as part of the Alliance’s overall contribution to international security and stability and conflict prevention. The Initiative builds upon NATO’s extensive expertise in supporting, advising and assisting nations with defence and related security capacity building. Building on our close cooperation and following their requests, we have agreed to extend this initiative to Georgia, Jordan, and the Republic of Moldova. We are also ready to consider requests from interested partners and non-partners, as well as to engage with international and regional organisations, with an interest in building their defence and related security capacity through this demand-driven initiative. We reaffirm NATO’s readiness to provide defence and related security capacity advisory support for Libya when conditions permit. We will pursue these efforts in complementarity and close cooperation with other international organisations, in particular the UN, the EU, and the OSCE, as appropriate. Some partner nations themselves can bring unique partner insight and contributions to NATO capacity building efforts. We welcome the appointment of NATO’s Deputy Secretary General as Special Coordinator for Defence Capacity Building, as well as the establishment of a military hub in the NATO Command Structure, to help ensure a timely, coherent and effective NATO response, taking into account efforts by partners and individual Allies, on a voluntary basis.
  77. We attach great importance to ensuring women’s full and active participation in the prevention, management, and resolution of conflicts, as well as in post-conflict efforts and cooperation. We remain committed to preventing conflict-related sexual and gender-based violence. Since our last Summit in Chicago, we have made significant progress in implementing UNSCR 1325 on Women, Peace and Security and related resolutions. We are now implementing the results of the Review of the Practical Implications of UNSCR 1325 for the Conduct of Operations. A revised Policy and Action Plan on Women, Peace and Security have been developed with our partners in the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council and with other partners3. The establishment of a permanent position of NATO Special Representative for Women, Peace and Security underscores the Alliance’s active engagement and commitment to this agenda. NATO’s cooperation with partner nations, international organisations, and civil society has been strengthened and should be further enhanced. Our ongoing efforts to integrate gender perspectives into Alliance activities throughout NATO’s three core tasks will contribute to a more modern, ready, and responsive NATO. We have directed the Council to submit a progress report on NATO’s implementation of UNSCR 1325 and related resolutions for our next Summit.
  78. We recall NATO’s firm commitment to the implementation of UNSCR 1612 and related resolutions on the protection of children affected by armed conflict and remain deeply concerned about the damaging effects of armed conflicts on children. NATO will continue to carry out its responsibilities as part of the wider international effort and to build on initiatives already taken to properly integrate this issue into the planning and conduct of its operations and missions, as well as its training, monitoring, and reporting. Therefore, in close cooperation with the UN, NATO will assess how to ensure it is sufficiently prepared whenever and wherever the issue of Children and Armed Conflict is likely to be encountered.
  79. The Open Door Policy under Article 10 of the Washington Treaty is one of the Alliance’s great successes. Successive rounds of NATO enlargement have enhanced the security and stability of all our nations. The steady progress of Euro-Atlantic integration fosters reform, strengthens collective security, and ensures the stability necessary for prosperity. NATO’s door will remain open to all European democracies which share the values of our Alliance, which are willing and able to assume the responsibilities and obligations of membership, which are in a position to further the principles of the Treaty, and whose inclusion will contribute to the security of the North Atlantic area. We reaffirm our strong commitment to the Euro-Atlantic integration of the partners that aspire to join the Alliance, judging each on its own merits. Decisions on enlargement are for NATO itself. We encourage partners to continue to implement the necessary reforms and decisions to advance their aspirations and prepare for membership, and we will continue to offer political and practical support to their efforts. Today we have endorsed decisions that take forward our Open Door Policy based on progress by individual partners that aspire to join the Alliance.
  80. NATO recognises Georgia’s significant efforts to strengthen its democracy and to modernise its military forces and defence institutions. We welcome the democratic development of Georgia, including through the peaceful transfer of power following parliamentary and presidential elections in 2012 and 2013, respectively. We encourage Georgia to continue implementation of reforms, including consolidating democratic institutions, taking forward judicial reforms, and ensuring full respect for the rule of law. NATO highly appreciates Georgia’s sizeable contribution to the ISAF operation and recognises the sacrifices Georgian troops have made in Afghanistan. Together with Georgia’s offer to participate in the NATO Response Force, these contributions demonstrate Georgia’s role as a contributor to our shared security. At the 2008 Bucharest Summit we agreed that Georgia will become a member of NATO and we reaffirm all elements of that decision, as well as subsequent decisions. Since then, Georgia has made significant progress and has come closer to NATO by implementing ambitious reforms and making good use of the NATO-Georgia Commission and Annual National Programme. We note that Georgia’s relationship with the Alliance contains the tools necessary to continue moving Georgia forward towards eventual membership. Today we have endorsed a substantial package for Georgia that includes defence capacity building, training, exercises, strengthened liaison, and enhanced interoperability opportunities. These measures aim to strengthen Georgia’s defence and interoperability capabilities with the Alliance, which will help Georgia advance in its preparations towards membership in the Alliance.
  81. We reiterate our continued support to the territorial integrity and sovereignty of Georgia within its internationally recognised borders. We welcome Georgia’s full compliance with the EU-mediated cease-fire agreement and other multilateral measures to build confidence. We welcome Georgia’s commitment not to use force and call on Russia to reciprocate. We continue to call on Russia to reverse its recognition of the South Ossetia and Abkhazia regions of Georgia as independent states and to withdraw its forces from Georgia. We encourage all participants in the Geneva talks to play a constructive role as well as to continue working closely with the OSCE, the UN, and the EU to pursue peaceful conflict resolution in the internationally recognised territory of Georgia.
  82. We welcome the significant progress made by Montenegro in its reforms, its constructive role in the Western Balkans region and the contribution that it makes to international security, including its contribution to our engagement in Afghanistan. In recognition of Montenegro’s progress towards NATO membership, the Alliance has agreed to open intensified and focused talks with Montenegro, and agreed that Foreign Ministers will assess Montenegro’s progress no later than by the end of 2015 with a view to deciding on whether to invite Montenegro to join the Alliance. These talks will be conducted in conjunction with the Membership Action Plan (MAP) process. In the meantime, we look to Montenegro to continue its efforts to address the remaining challenges, particularly with respect to rule of law and completing security sector reform. We also welcome the increase in public support in Montenegro for NATO membership and encourage continued efforts in this area.
  83. We reiterate the agreement at our 2008 Bucharest Summit, as we did at subsequent Summits, to extend an invitation to the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia4 to join the Alliance as soon as a mutually acceptable solution to the name issue has been reached within the framework of the UN, and strongly urge intensified efforts towards that end. An early solution, and subsequent membership, will contribute to security and stability in the region. We encourage and support the continuation of reform efforts within the country, particularly with a view to ensuring effective democratic dialogue, media freedom, judicial independence, and a fully-functioning multi-ethnic society based on full implementation of the Ohrid Framework Agreement. We also encourage further efforts to develop good neighbourly relations. We appreciate the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia’s long-standing contribution to our operations and its active role in regional cooperation. We value the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia’s long-standing commitment to the NATO accession process.
  84. We continue to fully support the membership aspirations of Bosnia and Herzegovina. We look forward to free and fair general elections in October, which we hope will lead to an efficient and effective government coalition, ready to address the issues related to the country’s Euro-Atlantic aspirations. We acknowledge the efforts undertaken since 2012 to come to a political agreement on registering the immovable defence property to the state. We remain concerned that little progress has been achieved to comply with the condition set by NATO Foreign Ministers in Tallinn in April 2010. As Allied Foreign Ministers will keep developments under active review, we encourage the leadership of Bosnia and Herzegovina to take the necessary steps in that regard so that its first MAP cycle can be activated as soon as possible. We appreciate Bosnia and Herzegovina’s contributions to NATO-led operations, and we commend its constructive role in regional dialogue and security.
  85. Here in Wales, our Foreign Ministers have met their counterparts from Bosnia and Herzegovina, Georgia, Montenegro, and the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia. Ministers discussed the progress made by these countries, the Euro-Atlantic integration process, and other key Summit issues, including the international security situation. NATO is grateful to these partners for the significant contributions that they continue to make to NATO’s objectives and to international security and stability.
  86. In light of NATO’s operational experiences and the evolving complex security environment, a comprehensive political, civilian, and military approach is essential in crisis management and cooperative security. Furthermore, it contributes to the effectiveness of our common security and defence, without prejudice to Alliance collective defence commitments. Today we reaffirm our decisions taken at the Lisbon and Chicago Summits. The comprehensive approach is conducive to more coherence within NATO’s own structures and activities. Furthermore, NATO has developed a modest but appropriate civilian capability in line with Lisbon Summit decisions. As part of NATO’s contribution to a comprehensive approach by the international community, we will enhance cooperation with partner nations and other actors, including other international organisations, such as the UN, the EU and the OSCE, as well as non-governmental organisations, in line with decisions taken. We will ensure that comprehensive approach-related lessons learned, including from ISAF, will be carried forward and applied in various strands of work and new initiatives, including, as appropriate, the Readiness Action Plan, the Connected Forces Initiative, the Defence and Related Security Capacity Building Initiative, and the Partnership Interoperability Initiative.
  87. In the spirit of the comprehensive approach and in light of a changing security environment in Europe, our Foreign Ministers met with the EU High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, the OSCE Chairman-in-Office and the Secretary General of the Council of Europe to discuss closer cooperation. At a time when the values and principles that underpin the major institutions in the Euro-Atlantic area are being challenged, Allies emphasised the need to work together to ensure our shared goal of a Europe whole, free and at peace. We look forward to continuing the dialogue to advance this further.
  88. NATO’s cooperation with the United Nations (UN) strengthens international security. We welcome our regular political dialogue on areas of common interest. We are encouraged by the growing practical cooperation between the staffs of our organisations, including exchanges of best practices and lessons learned in operations, training and exercises, and sharing of expertise. We are committed to exploring ways to reinforce our practical support to UN peace operations, including by enhancing cooperation between NATO and the UN in building defence and related security capacity.
  89. The European Union (EU) remains a unique and essential partner for NATO. The two organisations share common values and strategic interests. In a spirit of full mutual openness, transparency, complementarity, and respect for the autonomy and institutional integrity of both NATO and the EU, and as agreed by the two organisations, we will continue to work side-by-side in crisis management operations, broaden political consultations, and promote complementarity of the two organisations to enhance common security and stability. The current strategic environment has highlighted the need for further strengthening our strategic partnership and reinforcing our joint efforts and our common message.
  90. NATO recognises the importance of a stronger and more capable European defence, which will lead to a stronger NATO, help enhance the security of all Allies and foster an equitable sharing of the burden, benefits and responsibilities of Alliance membership. In this context, we welcome the EU member states’ decisions to strengthen European defence and crisis management, including at the European Council in December 2013.
  91. We look forward to continued dialogue and cooperation between NATO and the EU. Our consultations have broadened to address issues of common concern, including security challenges like cyber defence, the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, counter-terrorism, and energy security. We will also seek to work more closely together in several other areas, including maritime security, defence and related security capacity building, and addressing hybrid threats, in line with decisions taken.
  92. Non-EU Allies continue to make significant contributions to the EU’s efforts to strengthen its capacities to address common security challenges. For the strategic partnership between NATO and the EU, non-EU Allies’ fullest involvement in these efforts is essential. We encourage further mutual steps in this area to support a strengthened strategic partnership.
  93. We welcome the Secretary General’s report on NATO-EU relations. We encourage him to continue to work closely with the EU High Representative and the leaders of other EU institutions across the broad spectrum of the NATO-EU strategic partnership and provide a report to the Council in time for the next Summit.
  94. As demonstrated most recently by its activities in the framework of the Russia-Ukraine crisis, the Organisation for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) plays an important role in addressing the security challenges in the Euro-Atlantic area. We fully support efforts undertaken by the OSCE and continue to work closely with the OSCE in areas such as conflict prevention and resolution, post conflict rehabilitation and in addressing new security threats. We are committed to further enhancing our cooperation, both at the political and operational level, in all areas of common interest.
  95. We welcome the increasing emphasis by the African Union (AU) on addressing transnational security threats, and its growing efforts to build the African capacity to rapidly respond to emerging conflicts. We encourage deeper political and practical cooperation between NATO and the AU to support the African Union in establishing a more robust African peace and security capacity. Based on the AU’s request, NATO will continue to provide technical support and stands ready to explore, in consultation with the AU, opportunities to expand our logistical, training, and planning assistance in support of African peacekeepers. We welcome the recent progress in establishing a sound legal framework for NATO-AU cooperation.
  96. A stable and reliable energy supply, the diversification of routes, suppliers and energy resources, and the interconnectivity of energy networks remain of critical importance. While these issues are primarily the responsibility of national governments and other international organisations, NATO closely follows relevant developments in energy security, including in relation to the Russia-Ukraine crisis and the growing instability in the Middle East and North Africa region. We will continue to consult on and further develop our capacity to contribute to energy security, concentrating on areas where NATO can add value. In particular, we will enhance our awareness of energy developments with security implications for Allies and the Alliance; further develop NATO’s competence in supporting the protection of critical energy infrastructure; and continue to work towards significantly improving the energy efficiency of our military forces, and in this regard we note the Green Defence Framework. We will also enhance training and education efforts, continue to engage with partner countries, on a case-by-case basis, and consult with relevant international organisations, including the EU, as appropriate. Today we have noted a progress report on NATO’s role in energy security and we task the Council to continue to refine NATO’s role in energy security in accordance with the principles and guidelines agreed at the Bucharest Summit and the direction provided by subsequent Summits and the Strategic Concept. We task the Council to produce a further progress report for our next Summit.
  97. Key environmental and resource constraints, including health risks, climate change, water scarcity, and increasing energy needs will further shape the future security environment in areas of concern to NATO and have the potential to significantly affect NATO planning and operations.
  98. At the 2010 Lisbon Summit, Allies agreed on an ambitious reform programme, encompassing reviews of the Agencies and NATO Command Structure; resource reform; Headquarters reform; and an end-to-end review of all structures engaged in NATO capability development. Heads of State and Government took stock of progress at the 2012 Chicago Summit. Since then, NATO has continued to reform by instituting new policies, overhauling its structures, and streamlining procedures to improve efficiency and to ensure our Alliance is responsive and agile against the diverse challenges and threats it faces.
  99. NATO has adapted to drive further financial reform, harnessed the best efforts of our International Staff and International Military Staff, developed its NATO Command Structure, and achieved a greater level of coherence between its Agencies. While significant progress has been made in the reform of the Alliance, ongoing initiatives still need to be fully delivered and further efforts will be required. We have tasked further work in the areas of delivery of common funded capabilities, reform governance and transparency and accountability, especially in the management of NATO’s financial resources. We look forward to a further report on progress on these reforms by the time of our next Summit.
  100. We express our appreciation for the generous hospitality extended to us by the Government of the United Kingdom and the people of Wales. The decisions we have taken at our Summit will help to keep our nations and populations safe, the bond between Europe and North America strong, and our region and the world stable. We will meet again in Poland in 2016.

NATO and current European security challenges[2]

Remarks by NATO Deputy Secretary General Ambassador Alexander Vershbow at a seminar hosted by Folk och Försvar (People and Defence), Stockholm

12 Jun. 2015

Thank you Lena [Bartholdson, Secretary-General Folk och Försvar] for that kind introduction.

It is a pleasure to be with you today at the Museum of Mediterranean and Near Eastern Antiquities.

This magnificent place connects us to our past; a past that stretches back millennia.  It celebrates some of mankind’s great early civilisations.  The relics in this museum, and the stories that go with them, have inspired generations to achieve remarkable things.

But they are also a stark reminder of the dangers that our modern civilisation faces.  For across Iraq and Syria, the barbarians have returned.  In places like Mosul, Hatra and Palmyra, in addition to murdering people, the terrorists of ISIL are destroying humanity’s heritage on an epic scale.

Along with weak and failing states in North Africa and the Middle East, this is creating enormous pressure on the south, with millions of displaced people seeking shelter in neighbouring countries and across the Mediterranean in Europe – not to mention the ongoing threat of terrorist attacks on the streets of our own nations.

These are serious issues warranting serious discussion, but they are not the only challenges we face.  Today, I look not to the south, but to the east, to Russia.  Last year, Russia did something that no other European country has done since the Second World War: it took part of another sovereign nation by force.

With its illegal occupation of Crimea and its ongoing aggression in Eastern Ukraine, Russia is undermining decades of work by the international community to create a Europe whole, free and at peace.  And it is violating the principles of our international rules-based system: respect for borders, the equality of nations, and the settling of disputes by peaceful means.  It is jeopardizing a system that has brought unprecedented peace, security and prosperity to countless millions of people around the world, and threatening to return to the days of spheres influence.

NATO Allies do not and will not recognise the annexation of Crimea.  We believe that the full implementation of the Minsk agreements represents the best hope for peace in Ukraine, and we continue to urge all parties to do everything in their power to meet their commitments – especially the ceasefire and the withdrawal of heavy weapons.

Russia is a full party to the conflict and a signatory of the Minsk agreements.  It therefore carries a special responsibility:   to stop the violence, to withdraw its forces, to halt its arms supplies to the separatists, and to move from confrontation back to cooperation.

This new situation is not what any of us wanted.  For a quarter of a century, since the end of the Cold War, we worked hard to include Russia, not to isolate her.  We wanted a strategic partnership based on mutual interest, on shared values, and on the creation of a brighter future for us all.

To this end, the international community expanded the G7 to become the G8, and invited Russia to become a member of the World Trade Organisation.  At NATO, we gave Russia a position of privileged access and influence unmatched in our history.  We created the NATO-Russia Council and offered to work together on missile defence.  We cooperated in areas such as counter-terrorism and combating piracy off the Horn of Africa, and we worked together to bring peace and stability to the Balkans and Afghanistan.

This cooperation benefited NATO and it benefited Russia.  It brought us a stable Europe and it brought Russians greater security and prosperity than ever before.

But it appears that Russia has chosen a different path.  I hope that one day we can again be partners with Russia, but that day seems to me to be a very long way off.  President Putin has chosen anti-Western rhetoric and nationalist self-assertion as the basis for his regime.  He has sought to justify Russia’s aggressive actions on the basis of a false narrative of Western encirclement. This will not be easy to change.  So we must stand by our principles and prepare ourselves for the long haul.

At NATO, we are responding to the rising security challenges in the east and the south.

At our Summit in Wales last year, we reaffirmed our commitment to Article 5 of our founding treaty, which says that an attack on one Ally is an attack on all.  And we agreed to implement the largest increase in our defence posture since the Cold War.

The centrepiece of the Wales Summit, the Readiness Action Plan (or RAP), has already led to a far more visible military presence in NATO’s eastern Allies, with a larger air policing operation, greater troop numbers on the ground, and an increased maritime presence in the Baltic and Black Seas.  We are setting up local command centres in six eastern Allies and we are doubling the size of our NATO Response Force, with a Spearhead Force able to respond to a crisis in any part of the Alliance at very short notice.

We are keeping NATO strong, because we believe that this is the best way to deter aggression and to protect our Allies against any threat.  But keeping NATO strong is also the best basis on which to engage with Russia and to support our partners – vulnerable partners like Ukraine, Georgia and Moldova, and also strong partners like Sweden.

Sweden is one of NATO’s most active, engaged and effective partners.  Sweden and NATO share the same values, the same commitment to democracy, human rights, the rule of law and to the United Nations.  And we share the same dedication to building a safer and more secure world.  To this end, Swedish forces have stood side-by-side with NATO troops in NATO-led, UN-mandated operations in Kosovo, Afghanistan and Libya.

Time and again, Sweden has demonstrated the effectiveness of its partnership with NATO.  The speed with which Sweden has been able to respond is due to many years of close cooperation and interoperability with NATO forces.

Over time, our dialogue and cooperation have grown, with regular political consultations on common security concerns.  Our militaries work closely together, with Sweden making a significant contribution to training, education and exercises, to the implementation of UNSCR 1325 on women, peace and security, and to many other partnership activities.

This closeness was recognised at last year’s NATO Summit, when Sweden became one of the very first nations to receive what we call “Enhanced Opportunity Partner” status.  This is not an attempt at membership by the back door – membership is something separate and it remains a matter for the Swedish government and for the Swedish people alone to decide whether you wish to follow that path.

But Enhanced Opportunity Partnership is an opportunity for deeper, more significant and more tailored cooperation, both practical and political:  to share intelligence; to consult politically; to develop a shared assessment of the challenges we face; and to consider further joint work to address those challenges.  And it is essential if we are to maintain and strengthen the interoperability of our forces.

Enhanced Opportunity Partner status also means greater access to exercises, evaluations and training.  Right at this moment, Sweden is taking part in the annual ‘BaltOps’ maritime exercise, the largest exercise in the Baltic Sea this year, including ships from 17 countries.  And in 2018, Sweden and Finland will take part in the High Visibility Exercise in Norway.

All of these exercises are held with the utmost transparency – you can read the schedule of our planned exercises on NATO’s website – and each is in line with all of our international obligations.

This level and degree of cooperation is essential given the challenge of a newly aggressive Russia.  For Russia is also holding military exercises.  But theirs are different.  Russia uses loopholes in the provisions of the Vienna Document – the agreement that should ensure openness and transparency of exercises – to avoid notifying us of the largest military exercises in the post-Cold War era.

Three of Russia’s no-notice ‘snap’ exercises have included over 80,000 troops.  One such exercise, in February last year, was used to deploy forces to annex Crimea.  Others have masked support to separatists in eastern Ukraine and led to the build-up of forces on Ukraine’s border.

This is typical of Russia’s hybrid warfare, using all the military and non-military means at its disposal to achieve its objectives.  In Ukraine, it has used proxy soldiers, unmarked special forces, intimidation and propaganda to create confusion and obscure its true purpose, all within a cloak of deniability.

We must be ready to deal with every aspect of this new reality, and that means working closely with allies and like-minded partners to decide how best to prepare for, deter, and – if necessary – defend against hybrid threats.

A few years ago, Sweden and the Allies enjoyed a benign security environment in the northern region.  But we have to recognise that this has now changed.  Sweden has responded with an increase in its defence budget, by investing in new defence capabilities, and by increasing its cooperation with its northern neighbours, including Allies like Denmark, Norway and the Baltic states.  More interaction with NATO can also increase Sweden’s security.

Recent Russian behaviour is provocative and destabilising.  It is only by cooperating closely, by sharing our insights, and by being strong and standing up to Russia that we can hope to one day encourage it to return to its rightful place at the international top table.

Sweden, of course, is a member of the European Union, and closer partnership between the EU and NATO is an area long championed by Sweden, and we are grateful for your efforts to bring our two institutions closer together.

These past few years, the relationship between NATO and the European Union has continued to strengthen.  We have held more regular political consultations, including on the situation in Ukraine.  We have cooperated in operations, including in the Western Balkans and the fight against piracy.  And we have worked together to improve our capabilities by encouraging pooling and sharing, and multinational projects.

But given the scope and complexity of the challenges before us, I feel that we must do more, demonstrating even greater unity of purpose.  Especially as we deal with hybrid threats and efforts to destabilise our neighbours.  The countries of the Western Balkans, Ukraine, Georgia and Moldova all aspire to a European future.  NATO is working with these countries to reform their defence sectors and to build effective armed forces.  And I hope there will be a role too for Sweden to help here, both directly and through complementary activities within the EU framework.

We are also helping those that wish to move towards the possibility of NATO membership.  For instance, by the end of this year, NATO Foreign Ministers will assess Montenegro’s reform progress, with a view to deciding whether to invite the country to join the Alliance.  The European Union is helping these countries too – helping them to stay on the path of democratic reform, to open up their economies and to build effective institutions.

Together, we are helping our eastern neighbours to become stronger and more able to chart their own course.  This is our moral duty and it is also in our own strategic interests.

The same logic applies to our southern neighbours.  By complementing and reinforcing each other’s efforts, NATO and the EU can help them to become stronger, better able to look after their own security, and to project stability in their region.

There is more that NATO and the EU can do and we are discussing how we might work more closely together in areas such as countering Russian propaganda, defence capacity building, maritime security, and cyber defence.

Ladies and gentlemen,

The reason Sweden is such a close and long-standing partner of NATO is not simply because we face the same challenges, but because we share the same values.  We are all committed to maintaining a Europe that is peaceful, prosperous and free.  We are all committed to democracy, to human rights and the rule of law.  And we know that we are far more likely to protect all of these things if we work together.

NATO-Sweden cooperation is a win-win situation for us all.  It is a way for Sweden to make a major contribution not just to its own security but also to global peace and stability – in full respect of Sweden’s tradition of non-alignment.

So I look forward to our continued active engagement in the years ahead.




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